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ABSTRACT 
JENNA ASHLEY ROBINSON: Partisan Bias and Competition: The Effect of 
Redistricting Methods on State Legislative Elections 
(Under the direction of Virginia Gray) 
 
 Since Elbridge Gerry signed his infamous salamander, legislative 
redistricting has been a highly contentious and partisan process. Reformers have 
used legal constraints, court cases, and changes in redistricting authority to 
attempt to create districts that are fair and competitive. This work examines 
whether those methods are successful. Specifically, I test whether independent 
redistricting commissions, traditional districting principles, and court challenges 
affect partisan symmetry and whether partisan symmetry plays a role in electoral 
competition. I find that maps drawn by commissions, courts, and executive 
officials have a higher degree of partisan symmetry than those drawn by state 
legislatures and that maps with more symmetry result in more competitive 
legislative elections. 
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CHAPTER ONE: FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
In 2000, Barack Obama, then an Illinois state senator, challenged 
Congressman Bobby Rush in the Democratic primary. Obama received 30 
percent of the vote in a four-way contest; Rush retained his seat. Wishing to 
avoid challengers in future elections, Rep. Rush used the congressional 
redistricting process—which, in Illinois, is in the hands of the state legislature—to 
shift his district’s boundary so that Obama’s residence was no longer in his own 
district and instead in Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr.’s district.  His ambitions temporarily 
thwarted, Obama turned to the state legislative redistricting process to pave the 
way for his eventual U.S. Senate campaign. Due to a quirk in timing, Illinois state 
legislative districts were drawn after the congressional districts. Obama helped to 
redraw his African-American majority state senate district in central Chicago to 
include expensive high-rise apartments north of downtown along Lake Michigan’s 
shoreline—creating a biracial electoral coalition that later helped him win his seat 
in the U.S. Senate (Mercurio 2001). 
Following the 2000 Census, then-state legislator Brad Miller played a 
significant role in drawing North Carolina’s new Congressional maps—including a 
new district to accommodate the state’s growing population. The new 13th district, 
which included many urban Democrats, also included now-Congressman Miller’s 
house—and cuts the city of Raleigh in thirds. (After Republicans gained control of 
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the North Carolina Legislature in 2010, they altered the district to exclude Miller’s 
neighborhood—forcing Miller to run against another incumbent Democrat or 
leave Congress.) 
Sam Roberts of the New York Times recounted an election in Iowa 
wherein prisoners made up most of one city council district. During the 2002 
election cycle, the town of Anamosa, Iowa was divided into four City Council 
wards of about 1370 people each. Ward 2, however, contained a state 
penitentiary that housed over 1320 prisoners—who are not allowed to vote. 
Thus, Ward 2’s actual population was comprised of fewer than sixty eligible 
voters. Anamosa’s districting plan granted approximately sixty true Ward 2 
constituents the same level of representation on the City Council accorded to 
over 1300 people in each of the other three wards. 
In each case, the individuals drawing the maps stood to gain personally by 
influencing the redistricting process. In this dissertation, I will examine: Which 
apportionment methods lead to fair elections? Are some methods more effective 
than others? Do fairer districts lead to more competitive elections?  
In order to answer these questions, I examine fairness in electoral 
outcomes, competition in elections, and the effect of redistricting on both fairness 
and competition. Specifically, I measure the effects of different systems of 
apportionment—apportionment by legislators, legislators and governors, judges, 
and independent commissions—on the fairness of electoral outcomes in state 
house races in ten states (Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, Mississippi, New 
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and North Carolina, with a special 
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emphasis on the latter) from 2000 to 2008. The states were chosen to represent 
the different mechanisms used to apportion legislatures across the states as well 
as political culture and regional variation, including Voting Rights Act restrictions 
(more on state selection in chapter 3). I then determine whether fair elections 
lead to more electoral competition by examining election outcomes.  
In North Carolina, I carefully examine General Assembly elections from 
2000 to 2010, when the districts changed frequently due to legal challenges 
brought by the minority Republican party during that time. As such, the quickly 
changing districts, and the history, personalities, and strategies involved are an 
excellent case study. In this chapter, I consider the concept of fairness and its 
history as a component of democratic elections.  
 
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 
Jonathan Winburn summarizes the normative importance of fair 
redistricting in The Realities of Redistricting: “Democracy does not exist without 
elections. For a democracy to endure, elections must not only take place, but be 
held in a free, open, and competitive manner where citizens’ voices can be 
heard” (p.2). 
As such, thorough understanding of the effects of redistricting at all levels 
is imperative for thriving democracy. Redistricting is one of the few activities that 
allow incumbent elected officials to directly affect their future as political 
candidates and the quality of democracy in the area where they serve. 
Legislative redistricting is among the most partisan of policy activities undertaken 
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by state legislatures. In essence, the legislature takes the position that political 
districting is a matter of preserving self-interest: “the spoils of politics belong to 
the strongest and district line-drawing can be manipulated to improve the political 
position of the party which controls each chamber” (Book of the States 2005, 
p.10). 
Many government reformers in the United States have targeted 
redistricting as the area most in need of attention. Good government advocates 
on both sides of the aisle have called for more “fair” elections. St. Petersburg 
Times columnist Martin Dykman summarized reformers fears about 
gerrymandered districts: “You didn’t choose your legislators, they chose you” 
(2003: D3).1 
But what is “fairness?” Many people see “fairness” as a synonym for 
accurate representation—embodied by the principle of one person, one vote. As 
such, “fairness” is measured in proportional voting systems simply by comparing 
the proportion of seats awarded to party members in the legislature to votes cast 
for that party and its candidates in a given system. In such systems, looking at 
electoral outcomes is sufficient to determine whether the system is “fair.” 
Measuring fairness in plurality voting systems, such as those used in the United 
States, is more difficult; scholars must look both at representation and partisan, 
incumbency, and racial bias. Elimination of malapportionment is not enough to 
ensure fairness. 
Historically, legal reformers and scholars have focused on one type of 
                                                        
1
 As quoted in Winburn 2008. 
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procedural fairness (eliminating biases) instead of either on who draws the maps, 
which is another procedural concern, or on examining outcomes (representation). 
Legal reformers focused on an idea of fairness mainly consisting of an absence 
of barriers to representation. (Some notorious such impediments to voting 
included literacy tests, poll taxes, “grandfather” clauses, and other regulations in 
the Jim Crow South intended to prevent African Americans from voting.) 
These state provisions were upheld by the Supreme Court in early 
litigation, from 1875 (United States v. Cruikshank) through 1904. The House 
Committee on Elections ceded responsibility for elections in its 1905 decision on 
Dantzler v. Lever, which suggested that that citizens of South Carolina who felt 
their rights were denied should appropriately take their cases to the state courts, 
and ultimately, the Supreme Court (Pildes 2000). 
During the early 20th century, the Supreme Court began to find Jim Crow 
restrictions unconstitutional in litigation of cases brought by African Americans 
and poor whites. States reacted rapidly in devising new legislation to continue 
disfranchisement of most blacks and many poor whites. Although there were 
numerous court cases brought to the Supreme Court, Southern states effectively 
disfranchised most blacks through the 1960s. 
Later, legal reformers tackled racial gerrymandering with procedural 
reform by enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which outlawed discriminatory 
voting practices. Such practices had been responsible for the widespread 
disenfranchisement of African Americans in the U.S. by establishing extensive 
federal oversight of elections administration, particularly in the South. 
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Even after the Act’s passage, elimination of gerrymandering—both racial 
and political—remained the foremost goal of elections reformers. In order to 
achieve that goal, reformers rely on institutions and regulatory changes such as 
competitiveness requirements and even compactness standards. But such 
barriers to gerrymandering may not adequately address reformers’ root 
concern—the fairness of elections’ outcomes. (Partisans, on the other hand, may 
be disappointed that “fair” elections may not lead to the competitiveness that they 
desire—when not the party in power.) 
In more recent years, reformers have focused on another type of 
procedural fairness. They have mounted challenges to gerrymandering by 
removing the power of redistricting from legislators, an attempt to reign in self-
interest by either ensuring that no major party is excluded from the process or 
else guaranteeing that all political parties are excluded from the process (Gaines 
2002). Of course, it is possible, and even common, for electoral districts to be fair 
without resulting in competitive elections, and vice versa. 
The question remains: do redistricting reforms—such as special 
redistricting commissions, non-partisan boards, and judicial review of 
apportionment maps—really make elections more “fair?” Do other constraints on 
apportionment, such as compactness or whole-county provisions, contribute to 
fairer elections?  
There is no consensus among social scientists on how to evaluate 
fairness of maps according to actual election outcomes or even projections about 
new maps based on past outcomes. Decades of academic work on seats, maps, 
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and votes have produced many useful techniques for measurement. 
A measurement modeling tool developed by Andrew Gelman, Gary King, 
and Andrew C. Thomas (1987) allows users to answer that question, using 
partisan symmetry, or the absence of asymmetry in the seats-votes relationship, 
as a standard of fairness in legislative redistricting. Gelman and King define 
partisan symmetry to mean that in an election system where x% of the 
Democratic votes produces an allocation of y% of the seats to the Democrats, 
then when the Republicans win that same x% of the votes, the Republicans 
would win the same numbers of y% seats the Democrats had. They define 
partisan bias as absence of symmetry. 
This measurement of fairness incorporates principles that can be traced to 
the beginning of democratic elections. These principles ensure that democratic 
elections abide by the rule of law and reflect the real preferences of voters in a 
predictable, systematic, and unbiased manner. 
 
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines something to be fair if it is a) 
marked by impartiality and honesty : free from self-interest, prejudice, or 
favoritism a very fair person to do business with b) (1) conforming with the 
established rules : ALLOWED (2) consonant with merit or importance : DUE a fair 
share or c) open to legitimate pursuit, attack, or ridicule fair game. 
 This definition is insufficient, however. We must ask: What is fairness in 
the context of democratic elections? Fairness to whom? Is 
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outcome, or both that should be held to some standards? What features of 
process or outcome reflect “fairness”? 
Montesquieu (1748) proposed that a requirement for a real democracy is 
that the people should assemble to pass laws, and consequently that such a 
republic could have only a small territory. John Stevens (1787), under the 
pseudonym “Americanus” explained that the solution to this problem was to 
introduce the concept of representation, which would demand less of its citizens 
than direct democracy and allow for larger republics. Representation—the 
practice of some chosen individuals to stand in for the opinions and preferences 
of others—has become one of two cornerstones of the modern concept of 
electoral fairness. 
It should be noted that fairness is, at least in part, predicated on the idea 
that representatives reflect the preferences of the electorate—at least in broad 
terms. British politician Edmund Burke in his 1774 Speech to the Electors at 
Bristol at the Conclusion of the Poll outlined the principles of representation 
against the notion that elected officials should be delegates who exactly mirror 
the opinions of the electorate. 
It ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the 
strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved 
communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great 
weight with him; their opinion, high respect; their business, unremitted 
attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his 
satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their 
interest to his own. But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his 
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enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to 
any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, 
nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, 
for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes 
you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of 
serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion” (1990, p. 6). 
Pitkin (1967) notes that Burke considered a district's interest as linked with 
the proper behavior of its elected official, explaining, "Burke conceives of broad, 
relatively fixed interest, few in number and clearly defined, of which any group or 
locality has just one. These interests are largely economic or associated with 
particular localities whose livelihood they characterize, in his over-all prosperity 
they involve" (p. 174) 
In modern democratic theory, the other prerequisite for electoral fairness 
is lack of partisan bias (or presence of partisan symmetry). Partisan bias 
introduces asymmetry into the seats-votes relationship, resulting in an unfair 
partisan differential in the ability to win legislative seats. In the absence of any 
bias, representation can take two pure forms: strict proportional representation, in 
which the percentage of seats equals the percentage of votes; and winner-take-
all elections (in which the single winner is the person with the most votes). Many 
other possibilities exist in between these two pure forms. The essence of 
fairness—lack of bias and accurate one person, one vote representation—in 
democratic states is realized in the translation of seats to votes. Adam Cox 
(2004) correctly identifies partisan fairness as “a normative commitment that both 
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scholars and the Supreme Court have identified as a central concern of 
districting arrangements” (p. 751). 
This modern conception of fairness evolved years after the beginnings of 
democracy. It is only in very recent history that both features of fairness have 
become apparent in any political systems. 
The term democracy first appeared in ancient Greek political and 
philosophical thought. In his Laws, Plato (360 BCE) outlined a system of 
government in which the principle of representation is evident in both the 
composition of the assembly and in the method of selecting magistrates and the 
council.  
Charles Hignett (1962) describes the political system in Athens, birthplace 
of democracy, which had two distinguishing features of democratic government: 
the allotment of ordinary citizens to government offices and courts and the 
assembly of all citizens. But even in this radical new system, bias was rampant 
and representation almost unheard of. Instead of rule by one, Athens’ 
government was ruled by relatively few. Rights of citizens rested largely on 
heredity; only men from certain families who had completed their military 
service—a little more than ten percent of the population—were given the 
franchise; this excluded women, slaves, those who were born in other cities, and 
any man who had not served in the military. Those who did vote were de facto 
members of government, voting not for representatives but directly on legislation 
and executive bills. Those few participants in government exercised considerable 
power over those without voting rights (Hignett 1962). 
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In one way, however, Athenian government laid the groundwork for 
modern ideas about the rule of law. Around 500 BC, widespread demand among 
Athenian commoners for equal laws and rights among all citizens led 
Cleisthenes, “father of Athenian democracy,” to reform the constitution of Athens 
to set it on a democratic footing in 508/7 BC.  
He changed the political organization of Athens by increasing the size of 
the assembly, increasing the number of tribes and changing the basis of their 
composition from family ties to area of residence, and dividing governance 
nationally and locally (Aristotle, 350 BCE). These changes created a rudimentary 
form of districts. Cleisthenes’ motivating concept—equality under the law—is the 
fundamental basis for the modern one-man-one-vote principle. This constitutional 
change to the number and composition of tribes was, in effect, the first 
redistricting. The partisans of the day—those who might have benefited or lost by 
different possible divisions of tribes—had no hand in making these decisions. 
By the time of the Roman Republic, some form of representation had 
emerged along the lines suggested in Plato’s Laws, but bias kept participation 
low. Although domestic laws were still passed by way of direct democracy in 
various councils and assemblies, citizens also elected their own magistrates, 
tribunes, and military leaders to represent them in foreign and military affairs. The 
Tribal Assembly’s composition was based on geographical divisions, much like 
modern Congressional districts. Strong biases based on ancestry, class, and 
gender kept many Romans from participating in government affairs. Today's 
modern representative democracies imitate more the Roman model—with its 
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division of powers and multiple legislative chambers—than the Greek (Lintott 
1999). 
In “Letters from the Federal Farmer” Lee, (1787) explains the main 
“defect” of the Roman system compared to more modern representative 
democracies: it lacked an appropriate system of representation. He states, “The 
people were too numerous to assemble, and to do anything properly themselves; 
the voice of a few, the dupes of artifice, was called the voice of the people” (Lee 
1787, Letter VIII). Millar (2002) summarizes this argument in The Roman 
Republic in Political Thought: “The ten tribunes were no substitute for the proper 
level of representation shown in the British House of Commons, for they were 
mere individuals who belonged to the same class as the other Senators” (p. 122). 
The next national democratic experiment began in Swiss cantons as early 
as the 14th century. When Switzerland became a federal state in 1848, direct 
democracy instruments were introduced at the national level as well. The federal 
constitution introduced the principle of holding a mandatory referendum in order 
to change the constitution, as well as the popular initiative for a total revision of 
the constitution. Further rights of referendums were introduced in 1874, and the 
popular initiative for a partial revision of the constitution in 1891. This 
commitment to full participation and equal input for ordinary citizens produces fair 
outcomes by forcing the government to seek wider consensus about statutory 
(and constitutional) measures that it seeks to introduce than is the case in a 
purely representative system (Greenwood 1998). 
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In Liberalism: A Socio-Economic Exposition, Ludwig Von Mises outlined 
history’s aversion to the principles of equality under the law that underlie the ideal 
of one person, one vote:  
Before the rise of liberalism even high-minded philosophers, founders of 
religions, clerics animated by the best of intentions, and statesmen who 
genuinely loved their people, viewed the thralldom of a part of the human 
race as a just, generally useful, and downright beneficial institution. Some 
men and peoples are, it was thought, destined by nature for freedom, and 
others for bondage” (Mises 1978, p.20). 
Throughout U.S. history, there have been two fronts in the war to improve 
electoral fairness: one to eliminate racial and gender biases and another to 
eliminate gerrymandering. The word gerrymander was used for the first time in 
the Boston Gazette newspaper on March 26, 1812. The word was created in 
reaction to a redrawing of Massachusetts state senate election districts under the 
then governor Elbridge Gerry. Gerrymandering is used to achieve desired 
electoral results—usually for a particular party or political incumbents, but also to 
help or hinder a particular group of constituents, such as a political, racial, 
linguistic, religious or class group. Societies whose legislatures use a single-
winner voting system are the most likely to have members that gerrymander for 
partisan political advantage. Gerrymandering is particularly effective in non-
proportional systems that tend towards fewer parties, such as first past the post 
used in the United States. 
The Center for Voting and Democracy, which focuses on fairness in 
representation and participation, calls the process of gerrymandering an unfair 
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abuse of reapportionment for partisan purposes. “By gerrymandering the 
districts, legislators and their political cronies have used redistricting to choose 
their voters, before voters have had the opportunity to choose them” 
(FairVote.org, 2011). 
The modern judicial definition of fairness regarding apportionment and 
representation first appears in Gaffney v. Cummings (1973), in which the Court 
permitted deviations in population that contributed to a more balanced partisan 
districting plan: “The very essence of districting is to produce a different—a more 
‘politically fair’—result than would be reached with elections at large…” (93 S. Ct. 
2321 at 2329). Later cases cite the same principle; in Davis v. Bandemer (1986), 
which addressed partisan gerrymandering, the Supreme Court elaborated: “The 
very essence of districting is to produce a different—a more ‘politically fair’—
result than would be reached with elections at large, in which the winning party 
would take 100 percent of the legislative seats” (106 S. Ct. 2797 at 2808). 
Typical measures of electoral fairness compare the fairness of electoral 
outcomes between systems. The single-member district plurality system used in 
most U.S. states is often criticized for encouraging tactical voting, wasted votes, 
and gerrymandering, and discouraging third parties. Critics note that the most 
commonly expressed disadvantage of any first-past-the-post systems is that the 
winners of the election may not precisely reflect the distribution of votes, with 
substantial minority vote blocs ignored in their entirety, to the advantage of 
plurality winners. 
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Measuring fairness within a plurality system is more difficult. “Partisan 
fairness” can mean many things. Some reformers and scholars equate political 
fairness with proportional representation and conclude that election systems are 
politically fair only when they guarantee proportional representation for every 
constituency—politically and demographically. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, some argue that a pure winner-take-all system is most fair. The 
simplest, and least contentious, definition of partisan fairness, called “partisan 
symmetry” is the absence of partisan bias, where partisan bias is the degree to 
which the electoral system makes it easier for one party (and harder for the 
other) to translate its votes into seats. 
A consensus has existed in the academic literature since at least King and 
Browning (1987) on partisan symmetry as one standard for fairness, and even 
the U.S. Supreme Court now appears to agree that symmetry might be a helpful 
tool (LULAC v. Perry); see Grofman and King (2008). The concept of partisan 
symmetry as a standard for assessing partisan gerrymandering defines, 
distinguishes, and measures "partisan bias" and "electoral responsiveness" (or 
"repesentation"), key concepts that had been conflated in much previous 
academic literature, and "partisan symmetry" as the definition of fairness to 
parties in districting. Grofman and King (2008 pp.4-5) wrote “the symmetry 
standard…requires that the electoral system treat similarly-situated parties 
equally, so that each receives the same fraction of legislative seats for a 
particular vote percentage as the other party would receive if it had received the 
same percentage.” The symmetry definition of fairness evaluates the electoral 
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system as a whole by evaluating how voter preferences statewide are translated 
into the division of legislative seats between the parties. 
Using partisan symmetry as a standard, it is possible to examine 
districting processes, various measures of competition—including seat share, 
vote share and analysis of individual contests—and their relationship to electoral 
fairness in state elections. Ultimately, this dissertation uncovers the various 
factors that explain fairness, with a focus on the role of redistricting, and 
measures the relationship between fairness and competition. 
Others insist that fairness is impossible to quantify. They say that Justice 
Potter Stewart’s observation about obscenity—“I’ll know it when I see it”—applies 
just as well to unfairness in elections (Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184). The 
existence of obviously gerrymandered districts lends credence to this argument. 
According to many reformers, the U.S. has not achieved fairness—
whatever the definition. Writing for the Heartland Institute, a reform group that 
wants to reign in legislative redistricting, political scientist Brian Gaines (2001 
p.1) has this to say about the process: “So widespread is the belief that these 
districts are typically drawn in an unfair way that many people use the pejorative 
term ‘gerrymandering’ as a synonym for ‘redistricting.’ 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
 Max Weber (2004 p.154) said in Politics as a Vocation that something is 
“a 'state' if and insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its order.”   
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The idea of legitimate use of force is what separates a Hobbesian jungle—
the “war of all against all”—from a modern political state. Throughout most of 
Western history, legitimate rule was held to be a divine right, passed from God to 
Kings. 
It is only since the Enlightenment that scholars have held that a 
government's legitimacy and moral right to use state power is only justified and 
legal when derived from the people or society over which that power is exercised.  
In Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651), one of the earliest and most influential 
examples of social contract theory, individuals cede their rights to an absolute 
sovereign in exchange for protection. According to Hobbes, once citizens have 
ceded authority, they may not reclaim their rights or alter the form of government. 
Representation mattered little to Hobbes; he believed that democracy was 
possible, but inferior in every way to an absolute monarchy. 
Modern democracies establish consent of the governed, and thus 
legitimate right to rule, via elections to choose representatives of the people. 
 The American Declaration of Independence states, “Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed…” The founders of the United States believed, like the political 
philosopher John Locke, in a state built upon the consent of "free and equal" 
(while male) citizens; in their eyes, a state otherwise conceived would lack 
legitimacy and legal authority. This idea was also expressed in the Virginia Bill of 
Rights, especially Section 6: 
That elections of members to serve as representatives of the people, in 
assembly, ought to be free; and that all men, having sufficient evidence of 
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permanent common interest with, the attachment to, the community, have 
the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for 
publick uses without their own consent, or that of their representatives so 
elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not, in like manner, 
assented, for the public good." 
In order to fulfill the promises of the Declaration of Independence, 
elections must be unbiased and governments must represent all of the 
citizens who are governed. Most of the barriers to truly fair elections, once 
common across the United States, have now fallen. From the end of property 
requirements for voting, to the fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-sixth 
amendments—giving franchise to blacks, women, and all citizens over 18—to 
the end of Jim Crow laws in the South, most of the United States populace 
now give at least tacit consent to be governed through their freedom to 
participate in elections (Simmons 1976). 
 
A DEFENSE OF COMPETITION 
The Center for Responsive Politics reports that from 1998 to 2008, U.S. 
House incumbents have won between 94 and 98 percent of their reelection 
races. Electoral competition is in decline in state and primary elections as well. 
Reformers, who point to gerrymandering and a host of other targets for change, 
argue that improving competition will produce voters who are more interested in 
elections, better-informed on issues, and more likely to turn out to the polls. 
The legislative branch of government was designed to be responsive and 
accountable; yet for many around the country it is becoming stagnant and 
immune to constituents’ concerns (Center for Responsive Politics 2012). 
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Elections are the vehicles through which Americans choose who governs 
them; the power of the ballot enables ordinary citizens to hold public officials 
accountable. Competition is necessary to keep American politics vibrant, 
responsive, and democratic. 
Michael P. McDonald and John Samples chronicled many normative 
arguments favoring electoral competition in their book, The Marketplace of 
Democracy: Electoral Competition and American Politics (2006 Ch.1). They 
name liberty, equality and accountability, community concerns and 
constitutionality as arguments favorable to increasing competition in U.S. 
elections. 
Liberty: Classical liberals believe that government possesses a monopoly 
on violence that is both necessary and a threat to its citizens. Economists expect 
that, all things being equal, a monopolist will charge higher prices to consumers 
than would exist under perfect or imperfect competition. Similarly, economically 
minded citizens should expect that those who hold a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence will use it to further their own interests at some cost to the 
interests of others. In the absence of some effective constraint on government, 
the ruled should expect to be exploited by their rulers. Hence, in studying politics, 
public choice scholars have sought a set of institutions that constrain the actions 
of government officials in light of the wants of citizens (McDonald and Samples 
2006 Ch. 1). Elections and electoral competition, especially at the state level 
where most immediate policy is made, are means to control that monopoly on 
violence and restrain its abuse. The classically liberal part of the American vision 
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of politics thus values electoral competition as a way to control and limit 
government, thus preserving individual liberty. 
Equality: Electoral democracy begins with equality as embodied in “one 
person, one vote.” In shirking their responsibilities, elected officials acquire 
unaccountable power, an inequality that undermines the basic principle of 
democracy. Moreover, Progressives believe that representatives who are 
unaccountable to their voters are likely to be responsive to the political agenda of 
the economically powerful (McDonald and Samples 2006 Ch.1). Increased 
electoral competition precludes shirking and helps to decrease political 
inequality. 
Accountability: Vigorous competition among candidates and parties 
ensures that public officials serve the interests of those who elected them. 
Democratic theorists value electoral competition as a way to ensure that 
representatives are accountable to voters. As political scientist G. Bingham 
Powell2 (2002, p.20) said,  
“the citizens’ ability to throw the rascals out seems fundamental to modern 
representative democracy because it is the ultimate guarantee of a connection 
between citizens and policymakers. It enables the citizens to hold the 
policymakers accountable for their performance. Such accountability is a 
keystone of majoritarian democratic theory.” 
The Community: Fair representation requires a commitment to a 
government that reflects the preferences of its people (McDonald and Samples 
2006 Ch.1). If those preferences are distributed normally on a single issue, 
                                                        
2
 As quoted in Ischaroff 2002. 
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everyone is fully informed, a single representative is selected from a district, and 
majority rule determines outcomes, lawmakers will ultimately take policy stands 
that appeal to the median voter of their district (Downs 1957). Electoral 
competition between two viable candidates is essential to this outcome. 
Competition has other benefits to the general community besides 
representation. Electoral competition provides a partial solution to the problem of 
lack of voter information. Competition is related to more free campaign coverage 
by the media and more campaign expenditures aimed at informing and 
mobilizing voters. Competitive elections interest voters and draw them to the 
polls. Competition thereby fosters other indicators of a healthy democracy, such 
as higher levels of participation by voters and activists and stronger political 
parties that must evolve or perish in Darwinian political conflict (Cox and Munger 
1989, pp. 217–31). 
Constitutionality: The Constitution of the United States does not 
specifically require electoral competition, however several legal scholars have 
argued that the current dearth of electoral competition violates article 1 and the 
First Amendment of the Constitution. 
According to the Founders, the U.S. Constitution grants enumerated 
powers from the people to their government. Powers that are not granted to the 
state or national governments are retained by the people. Article 1, section 4 of 
the U.S. Constitution states that the “Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by 
the Legislature thereof.” This grant of power does not include “the power to 
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regulate congressional elections with the aim and effect of artificially insulating 
members of Congress from electoral competition through state creation of 
overwhelmingly ‘safe,’ non-competitive congressional election districts” 
(Isscharoff 2002 p.19). Yet the evidence indicates that state legislatures have 
exercised just such a power. 
Article 1, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that  
“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State 
shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch 
of the State Legislature.”  
McDonald and Samples (2006 Ch.1) explain that this language serves to 
recognize the sovereignty of the people and their affirmative right to elect the 
House of Representatives. Insofar as incumbent officials manipulate the electoral 
system to reduce electoral competition, they might be said to abridge the ultimate 
power of citizens. The First Amendment to the Constitution also bears on this 
issue. The First Amendment seeks to secure the conditions of liberal democracy, 
not the least of which is “the free flow of information needed to permit genuine 
electoral choice” (Isscharoff 2002 p.20). When incumbents create safe electoral 
districts, they preclude such choice and thereby contravene the fundamental 
purpose of the First Amendment. 
 
UP NEXT 
 In Chapter two, I lay out several options for achieving fairness via the 
redistricting process and traditional districting principles. I also describe the 
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legislative and judicial history of apportionment, highlighting the reforms that 
significantly changed the way Americans elect their legislators and lawmakers 
reapportion their districts. 
 Chapters three and four are empirical analyses. In chapter three I 
measure the effects of legislative redistricting on fairness, defined as partisan 
symmetry. Specifically, I will measure the effects of different systems of 
apportionment—apportionment by legislators, legislators and governors, judges, 
and independent commissions—on the partisan symmetry of electoral outcomes 
in state house races in ten states from 2002 to 2008. This analysis shows that 
both redistricting processes and traditional districting principles affect partisan 
symmetry.  
In chapter four, I test whether partisan symmetry, and by proxy 
reapportionment, affect electoral competition. This analysis shows that the 
degree to which a state apportionment plan achieves partisan symmetry affects 
electoral competition in legislative elections in that state. 
 In chapter five, I examine the redistricting process in one state—North 
Carolina—from 2000 to 2010. During that period, redistricting maps were 
challenged in both state and federal court, redrawn by judges and legislatures, 
ultimately creating a natural experiment in the effects of redistricting on electoral 
outcomes. I also examine the views of participants in the redistricting process 
about redistricting’s effects on fairness and competition. Through this case study, 
I will show that reformers, minority party members, and most partisan and non-
partisan observers are more interested in competition and electoral outcomes 
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than procedural fairness, but often conflate fairness and competition in 
measuring the success of electoral reform. 
 In chapter six, I review my findings and explore the implications of those 
findings, including possible normative consequences of such findings. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: A HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING 
In this chapter, I examine the history of redistricting in the United States—
from Elbridge Gerry’s famous salamander to recent court challenges upholding 
traditional districting principles. I focus on the legal boundaries guiding 
redistricting over the years, with a goal of focusing on practices and regulations 
that foster partisan symmetry and competition and highlighting the reforms that 
significantly changed the way Americans elect their legislators and lawmakers 
reapportion their districts—such as judicial mandates of one, person, one vote 
and embargoes against racial gerrymandering. 
I also examine the four redistricting methods commonly used by states—
redistricting by legislature, redistricting by legislature and governor, redistricting 
by legislature and commission (hybrid), and redistricting by nonpartisan, 
independent, or bipartisan commission only. I will also consider the rare case in 
which judges participate in the redistricting process. 
 
THESIS 
In studying redistricting processes, I expect to find that districts drawn by 
disinterested parties, such as non-partisan districting commissions and judges, 
are fairer than those drawn by legislators, even in states where other 
constraints—such as Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act or other 
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districtingprinciples—are legally in place. I also expect to find that fairer districts 
contribute to, but are not sufficient to create, competitive elections. By looking 
closely at the North Carolina case, I expect to find that interested parties, 
including legislators and other partisans, often conflate competition and fairness. 
 
REPRESENTATION: A HISTORY OF VOTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
 Although the U.S. Constitution set basic guidelines for the election of the 
United States Congress, it leaves state level elections in state hands. States 
have created their own guidelines for elections. In North Carolina, for example, 
the state constitution prescribes: “at the first regular session convening after the 
return of every decennial census of population taken by order of Congress, [the 
state] shall revise the senate districts and the apportionment of Senators among 
those districts” (Article II, Section 3). It includes a similar clause concerning North 
Carolina House members. 
 For the most part, federal rules have been a model for state rules. In many 
cases, federal case law has eventually come to govern state elections as well. 
 
A Timeline of Representation and Redistricting in the U.S. 
 
1789 The U.S. Constitution is ratified, creating “a Congress of the United States, 
 which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives” which 
 “shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included 
 within this Union, according to their respective Numbers.” Election 
 regulations are left to the states: “The Times, Places and Manner of 
 holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
 each State by the Legislature thereof.” 
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1812 The term “Gerrymandering” is coined when Governor Elbridge Gerry 
 signed a bill that redistricted Massachusetts state Senate districts to 
 benefit the Democratic-Republican Party. 
 
1870 15th Amendment to the Constitution is enacted, prohibiting the denial of 
 suffrage based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
 
1913 17th Amendment to the Constitution is enacted, mandating direct election 
 of U.S. Senators. 
 
1920 19th Amendment to the Constitution is enacted, establishing women’s 
 suffrage. 
 
1944 In Smith v. Allwright, the U.S. Supreme Court overturns the Democratic 
 Party's use of all-white primaries in Texas and other states where the 
 party used the rule. 
 
1962 In Baker v. Carr, the U.S. Supreme Court establishes that 
 reapportionment issues present justiciable questions, thus enabling 
 federal courts to intervene  in and to decide reapportionment cases. 
 
1964 24th Amendment to the Constitution is enacted, prohibiting the revocation 
 of voting rights due to the non-payment of poll taxes. 
 
1964  "One Person, One Vote" principle is codified at the national level by 
 Wesberry v.  Sanders, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
 congressional districts had to be roughly equal in population. 
 
1964 "One Person, One Vote" principle is codified at the state level by Reynolds 
 v. Sims, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state legislative 
 districts must be roughly equal in population. 
 
1965 Voting Rights Act is passed, requiring Justice Department preclearance 
 for apportionment maps in certain states that have had a history of racial 
 barriers to voting. 
 
1980 In City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Supreme Court finds that a redistricting 
 plan would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or Section 2 of the 
 Voting Rights Act unless the plaintiffs could prove that its drafters intended 
 to discriminate against them. 
 
1982  Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is amended to clarify that it applied to 
 any plan that results in discrimination against a member of a racial or 
 ethnic  minority group, regardless of the intent of the plan's drafters. 
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1986 Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court sets forth three preconditions a minority 
 group  must prove in order to establish a violation of Section 2: 1) The 
 minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to 
 constitute a majority in a single-member district; 2) The minority group 
 must be politically cohesive, that  is, it must usually vote for the same 
 candidates; and 3) In the absence of special circumstances, block voting 
 by the White majority usually defeats the minority's preferred candidate. 
 
1993 In Shaw v. Reno, the Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that redistricting based 
 on race must be held to a standard of strict scrutiny under the equal 
 protection clause. 
 
1995 In Miller v. Johnson, race-neutral districting principles (compactness, 
 contiguity, respect for subdivisions or communities defined by actual 
 shared interests) were emphasized.  
 
1999 In Hunt v. Cromartie, the follow-up case to Shaw v. Reno, the Court ruled 
 that North Carolina’s 12th District was a constitutional example of political 
 gerrymandering. 
 
2004 In Vieth et al. v. Jubelirer, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that 
 some  standard for measuring “fairness” might be adopted in a future 
 case, if a manageable rule could be found, laying the ground for LULAC v. 
 Perry. 
 
2006 In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the U.S. Supreme 
 Court  rules that state legislatures may redraw districts as often as they 
 like (not just after the decennial census). Members of the court recognize 
 partisan symmetry as a “helpful tool” for measuring fairness. 
 
 
Redistricting: A Short Legal History 
 
 The word gerrymander was used for the first time in the Boston Gazette in 
March of 1812, in reaction to a redrawing of Massachusetts state senate election 
districts under Governor Elbridge Gerry. In that year, Governor Gerry signed a 
bill that redistricted Massachusetts to benefit his Democratic-Republican Party. 
When mapped, one of the districts in the Boston area was said to resemble the 
shape of a salamander. 
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 Appearing with the term was a political cartoon (shown in Figure 2.1) 
depicting an imaginary dragon-like animal satirizing the odd-shaped district. 
Federalist newspapers editors and others at the time likened the district shape to 
a salamander; critics of the plan created the word gerrymander by blending the 
word salamander with Governor Gerry's last name. 
 Gerrymandering should not be confused with malapportionment, whereby 
the number of eligible voters per elected representative can vary widely without 
relation to how the boundaries are drawn. 
 While gerrymandering still poses a challenge to fair elections, 
malapportionment was ended when equal population requirements were 
introduced in the 1960s. Altman (1998) points to Wesberry v Sanders, 376 U.S.1 
(1964) and Reynolds v. Sims, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964) as seminal cases. In the 
1990s, a new set of principles, again laid down by the court, began to address 
charges of racial gerrymandering in legislative redistricting. These race-neutral 
districting principles were emphasized in Miller v. Johnson, 63 U.S.L.W. 4726 
(1995): “compactness, contiguity, respect for subdivisions or communities 
defined by actual shared interests” (1995). 
 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Constraints Matter 
After Reconstruction and the granting of citizenship and suffrage to 
freedmen, state legislatures developed new constitutions with provisions to make 
voter registration and elections more complicated, such as poll taxes, residency 
requirements, literacy tests and grandfather clauses. These were designed to, 
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and effectively succeeded in, disfranchise most African Americans and many 
poor whites in southern states. In areas where African American and other 
minorities succeeded in registering, some states created districts that were 
gerrymandered to reduce the voting impact of minorities. 
With the Civil Rights Movement and passage of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, additional federal enforcement and protections of suffrage for all citizens 
were enacted. Gerrymandering for the purpose of reducing the political influence 
of a racial or ethnic minority group was prohibited, significantly affecting the 
outcomes in elections that succeeded the change. Poll taxes for federal elections 
were prohibited by ratification of the Twenty-fourth Amendment in 1964, and a 
later Supreme Court case struck down poll taxes as a prerequisite for any 
election. Gerrymandering for political gain has remained possible under the 
Constitution. 
After the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed, some states created 
"majority-minority" districts. This practice, also called "affirmative 
gerrymandering", was supposed to redress historic discrimination and ensure 
that ethnic minorities would gain more seats in government than they otherwise 
would. Since the 1990s, however, gerrymandering based predominately on racial 
data has been ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court under the 
Fourteenth Amendment (unless it survives strict scrutiny), first in Shaw v. Reno 
(1993) and subsequently in Miller v. Johnson (1995). 
The constitutionality of using racial considerations to create districts 
remains difficult to assess. In Hunt v. Cromartie (1999), the Supreme Court 
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approved a racially focused gerrymandering of a congressional district on the 
grounds that the motivation was not pure racial gerrymandering but instead 
partisan gerrymandering, which is constitutionally permissible. With the 
increasing racial polarization of parties in the South as conservative whites move 
from the Democratic to the Republican Party, gerrymandering may be partisan 
and also achieve goals for ethnic representation. 
In some circumstances, the use of goal-driven district boundaries may be 
used for positive social goals (at least considered so from less partisan 
viewpoints) such as the representation of communities of interest. For example, 
when the Arizona state legislature considered representation for Native American 
reservations following the 1990 census, legislators decided that the two tribes 
should not share a U.S. House member because of historic conflicts between the 
Hopi and Navajo nations. Since the Hopi reservation is completely surrounded by 
the Navajo reservation, the legislature created an unusual district configuration 
that features a fine filament along a river course several hundred miles in length 
to attach the Hopi reservation to a white majority district in Western Arizona 
(Ballotpedia 2012). 
In another case (frequently cited as an outrageous example of 
gerrymandering), the California state legislature created a congressional district 
that extends over a narrow coastal strip for several hundred miles. It ensures that 
a common community of interest will be represented, rather than the coastal 
areas being dominated by inland concerns (Ballotpedia 2012). These cases are 
illustrative of factoring in communities of common interest in drawing district 
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boundaries. 
 
Modern Changes to Redistricting 
Scholars cite the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr, which legally 
opened the question of legislative apportionment to judicial review, as the 
beginning of state legislative reform (Teaford 2002). That case began nearly a 
decade of conflict and confusion, which lasted through most of the 1960s. The 
struggle over reapportionment was reignited when the results of the 1970 census 
forced legislatures to redraw districts based on new population figures. 
Eventually, reapportionment eliminated the population disparities amongst 
districts, “forcing a ‘one-man, one-vote’ standard on recalcitrant state 
legislatures” (Teaford 2002 p.197). 
While the Supreme Court in Davis v. Bandemer found partisan 
gerrymandering to be justiciable, no redistricting plan challenged on those 
grounds in the subsequent 20 years has been held unconstitutional for that 
reason. In Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), although the plaintiffs’ claims of an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander by the Republican-dominated 
Pennsylvania legislature were ultimately rejected, two Supreme Court justices, 
quoting numerous law professors and social scientists expressed grave concern 
that computers had changed redistricting and removed fundamental constraints 
against gerrymanders. Five justices concluded that some standard for measuring 
“fairness” might be adopted in a future case, if a manageable rule could be 
found. When gerrymandering next came before the Court, in League of United 
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Latin American Citizens v. Perry, King, et al. filed an Amicus Brief (2005), 
proposing the test be based in part on the partisan symmetry standard. Although 
the issue was not resolved, justices discussed and positively evaluated the 
proposal in three of their opinions, including the plurality judgment. For the first 
time for any proposal for apportionment standards, the Court gave some 
indication that any future legal test for partisan gerrymandering would likely 
include partisan symmetry. Following that decision, Grofman and King were 
optimistic: 
“A majority of Justices now appear to endorse the view that the 
measurement of partisan symmetry may be used in partisan 
gerrymandering claims as “a helpful (though certainly not talismanic) tool” 
(Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer), provided one recognizes that 
“asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional 
partisanship” and possibly that the standard would be applied only after at 
least one election has been held under the redistricting plan at issue 
(Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg).” 
Kennedy’s concurrence reveals that we are still a long way from a 
court-adopted empirical standard. In his concurrence, he outlined the 
potential problems with adopting any strict standard to judge districts 
before they are put into use: “we are wary of adopting a constitutional 
standard that invalidates maps based on unfair results that would occur in 
a hypothetical state of affairs” (LULAC v. Perry). He is however, more 
encouraging about using standards to evaluate districts after an election: 
“Presumably such a challenge could be litigated if and when the feared 
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inequality arose (LULAC v. Perry). 
 
COMPETITION AND FAIRNESS—IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP? 
Elections are the vehicles through which Americans choose who governs 
them; the power of the ballot, in theory, enables ordinary citizens to hold public 
officials accountable. Competition is necessary to keep American politics vibrant, 
responsive, and democratic. 
Some scholars, such as Thomas Brunell, have challenged the widely held 
assumption that the best electoral districts are competitive districts. In his book, 
Redistricting and Representation: Why Competitive Elections are Bad for 
America (2008), Brunell takes a utilitarian view of elections by arguing that the 
practice of packing like-minded voters into homogeneous districts actually 
maximizes voter representation and satisfaction. 
Michael P. McDonald and John Samples counter that argument by 
chronicling many normative arguments favoring electoral competition in their 
book The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition and American 
Politics (2006, Ch.1). They name liberty, equality and accountability, community 
concerns and constitutionality as arguments favorable to increasing competition 
in U.S. elections. 
However, if we consider competition simply a possible outcome of fair 
elections, both arguments may be irrelevant. In both books, the authors argue for 
fairness, namely that competitive elections either are or are not “fair”—either in 
terms of outcome or in terms of procedure. This dissertation will help to clarify the 
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debate by determining the relationship between procedural fairness and 
competitive elections. 
Competition, at the most basic level, is simply the percentages of partisan 
victories. It can also be defined as “proportion of success,” “duration of success” 
and “frequency of divided control” of a legislative body. However, an examination 
of competition only considers the outcome of an election—not how those 
outcomes were determined. A state with very “competitive” elections doesn’t 
guarantee that citizens are fairly represented (in racial, incumbency, or partisan 
terms)—or even that the elections were conducted in a fair manner.  
In my analysis, I will use proportion of success to measure competition—
the difference between the winner and the loser in an election. This measure 
accurately captures the extent to which a real race between candidates exists in 
a given district. 
Ideally, fairness in districting should engender some level of electoral 
competition. I expect to find significant correlation between partisan symmetry 
(fairness) and proportion of partisan success (competition). However, fairness is 
not the only condition that creates competition. Incumbency, legislative 
professionalism, minority party strength, and legislative performance all affect 
legislative electoral competition, and I will include them in my analysis. 
 
REFORMING THE REAPPORTIONMENT PROCESS: A LOOK AT INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF COURTS 
 In this dissertation, I will examine three redistricting bodies—legislatures, 
 36 
commissions, and courts. 
 The first, and most common, way in which districts are drawn is by state 
legislatures, with approval from governors. In two states, Connecticut and North 
Carolina, districts are drawn by state legislatures and there is no gubernatorial 
veto power over redistricting plans. 
 Many states, in an effort to eliminate self-interested reapportionment 
plans, use nonpartisan or bipartisan commissions to draw districts. As of 2009, 
12 states had redistricting commissions (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington). A voter initiative in 2008 made California the 13th state to approve a 
commission. Others (Connecticut, Illinois, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas) 
have back-up commissions. Maine and Vermont have advisory commissions.  
 Idaho uses a bipartisan commission: “The Commission has six members; 
no member can be an elected or appointed official. Leaders of the two largest 
parties in the house and the senate appoint one member for a total of four, and 
the chairpersons of the two parties with the most votes for governor appoint one 
each” (Center for Voting and Democracy 2012). For example, in Alaska, “A five-
member, civilian Redistricting Board draws state legislative districts (there is only 
one U.S. House district). Two members are appointed to the commission by the 
governor, two by the legislature, and one by the Chief Justice of Alaska’s highest 
court. All four regions of the state must be represented on the committee and no 
state employees or state officials may be commission members” (Center for 
Voting and Democracy 2012). If all three branches of government are controlled 
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by the same party, the commission would likely be made up of partisans as well. 
 In some cases, commissions comprised of members of government 
without regard to party affiliation. For example, in Ohio’s officially nonpartisan 
commission, three members of the reapportionment board are elected officials. 
“The board consists of five members; the governor, the secretary of state, the 
state auditor, one appointee of the speaker and majority leader of the senate 
jointly, and one appointee chosen jointly by the minority leaders in each house” 
(Center for Voting and Democracy 2012). In 2001, Republicans held three of the 
offices in question, thus controlling the board and the redistricting process in that 
year. 
 In rare cases, members of the judicial branch of government participate 
directly in the redistricting process. In Louisiana, for example, “The legislature is 
responsible for both congressional and legislative redistricting. The house and 
senate Governmental Affairs committees have jurisdiction. The state Supreme 
Court will step in” if the legislature has not produced maps by the appointed 
deadline (Center for Voting and Democracy 2012). In a few states, members of 
commissions are appointed from amongst current state supreme course justices 
(Ballotpedia 2012). 
 In other cases, state courts become involved when individuals or political 
groups challenge the legislature’s decisions regarding redistricting. In most such 
cases, when the court decides for the plaintiffs, it simply returns the maps to the 
legislature, with an order to redraw the invalid portions. In rare instances, 
however, members of the court will participate in the redistricting process 
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directly—by redrawing the districts themselves. This happened following the 
2001 round of redistricting in North Carolina, when Judge Howard Manning 
redrew maps that had previous been approved by the Democratically controlled 
legislature. (A full explanation of North Carolina’s 2001 redistricting appears in 
Chapter 5.) 
As shown in Table 2.1, state-level general assemblies in the U.S. are 
governed first by the U.S. Constitution, federal law, then state constitutions, and 
finally by their own laws and occasionally the courts. In most cases, state 
constitutions do little in the way of limiting the actions of general assemblies, 
particularly in regards to their power over elections. In fact, the largest constraint 
on assemblies’ powers to create their own districts comes from the Voting Rights 
Act (1965). Scholars have identified several incentives that drive reapportionment 
bodies. David Mayhew (1974) first observed that reelection is the primary goal of 
all elected officials.  In The Realities of Redistricting, (2008) Winburn adds that 
they also have partisan goals.  
Thus, legislators have both personal and political incentives to 
gerrymander. Given these weak guards against assemblies’ districting powers, it 
is no surprise that many state legislatures have been accused of 
gerrymandering—and that plaintiffs accusations have been validated by courts. 
The court has often been the source of objective criteria for fairness and 
equal representation in legislative redistricting. The ideas of one-person-one-
vote, population equality, contiguity and compactness are amongst the standards 
most frequently required of legislative districts by constitutional provision and 
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judicial enforcement. While not all these requirements directly contribute to 
fairness, limitations on legislators’ flexibility (such as contiguity and compactness 
requirements) can have the effect of making gerrymandering more difficult. 
Checks on the legislative branch by the judiciary contribute to compact, 
competitive districts. 
The creation of equal population requirements in the 1960s and race-
neutral districting principles enforced in the 1990s addressed many of the most 
egregious malapportionments and racial gerrymanders, respectively. 
Despite these strides towards fairer elections, courts aren’t the only 
recourse, and are hampered in significant ways. First, courts are often slow to 
act. Second, they must rely on an outside party bringing a suit before taking any 
action. These two qualifications considerably limit the effects courts can have in 
an overall strategy to limit redistricting abuses. Instead of relying on courts, many 
reformers suggest changes to the redistricting process itself. 
The most commonly advocated electoral reform proposal targeted at 
gerrymandering is to change the redistricting process. Fairvote.org (2001) 
identifies six districting principles commonly used: compactness, contiguity, 
political subdivisions, communities of interest, cores of prior districts, and certain 
provisions of the Voting Rights Amendment. However, under more recent 
proposals, a presumably independent and objective commission is created 
specifically for redistricting, rather than having the legislature do it. This is the 
system used in the United Kingdom, where the independent Boundary 
Commission determines the boundaries for constituencies in the House of 
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Commons and regional legislatures. Adoption of the boundaries is subject to 
ratification by the body in question, but it is almost always granted without any 
debate (Johnston 1982). 
To help ensure neutrality, members of a redistricting agency may be 
appointed from relatively apolitical sources such as retired judges or 
longstanding members of the civil service, possibly with requirements for equal 
representation among competing political parties. Additionally, members of the 
board can be denied access to information that might aid in gerrymandering, 
such as demographic makeup or voting patterns that differ by geography. As a 
further constraint, consensus requirements can be imposed to ensure that the 
resulting district map reflects a wider perception of fairness, such as a 
requirement for a supermajority approval of the commission for any district 
proposal. Consensus requirements, however, can lead to deadlock, such as 
occurred in Missouri following the 2000 census. There, the equally numbered 
partisan appointees were unable to reach consensus in a reasonable time, and 
consequently the courts had to determine district lines. 
Some examples of independent commissions include the standing 
Washington State Redistricting Commission and the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission. The Rhode Island Apportionment Commission (from 
1990-2011) was ad hoc but developed the past two plans after decennial 
reapportionments (1991, 2001). The Rhode Island General Assembly adopted 
legislation to establish an 18-person commission to draft and recommend 
districts to the General Assembly in 2011.  
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In the state of Iowa, the nonpartisan Legislative Services Bureau (LSB) 
proposes boundaries of electoral districts. Aside from satisfying federally 
mandated contiguity and population equality criteria, the Iowa law mandates unity 
of counties and cities. Under Iowa’s legislation, consideration of political factors 
such as location of incumbents, previous boundary locations, and political party 
proportions is specifically forbidden. Since Iowa's counties are chiefly rectangles, 
the LSB process has led to districts that follow county lines (Buck 2008). 
In 2005, the state of Ohio had a ballot measure to create an independent 
commission whose first priority was competitive districts, a sort of "reverse 
gerrymander". A complex mathematical formula was to be used to determine the 
competitiveness of a district. The measure failed to obtain voter approval chiefly 
due to voter concerns that communities of interest would be broken up 
(Ballotpedia 2012). 
The success of the Voting Rights Acts illustrates the effectiveness of 
constraints on districtors. With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
additional federal enforcement and protections of suffrage for all citizens were 
enacted. Gerrymandering for the purpose of reducing the political influence of a 
racial or ethnic minority group covered by the Act was prohibited, significantly 
affecting the outcomes in elections that succeeded the change.   
This paper will argue that legislative redistricting done by non-legislative 
actors—commissions and, in two cases, courts—creates more fair (that is, 
symmetric) districts than redistricting done within the legislature, because 
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although members of commissions and judges may have partisan incentives to 
gerrymander, they have no personal incentives in play.  
 
UP NEXT 
 In the next chapter, I will measure the effects of legislative redistricting on 
fairness, defined as partisan symmetry. Specifically, I will measure the effects of 
different systems of apportionment—apportionment by legislators, legislators and 
governors, judges, and independent commissions—on the fairness (partisan 
symmetry) of electoral outcomes in state house races in ten states from 2002 to 
2008. This analysis shows that both redistricting processes and traditional 
districting principles positively affect partisan symmetry.  
 FIGURE 2.1: ELBRIDGE GERRY
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’S SALAMANDER 
 44 
TABLE 2.1 STATES’ REDISTRICTING METHODS (2000) 
State Redistricting Method: State Assemblies Term Limits 
Alabama Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Alaska Commission No 
Arizona Commission Yes 
Arkansas Commission Yes 
California Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Yes 
Colorado Commission Yes 
Connecticut Legislature only No 
Delaware Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Florida Legislature only Yes 
Georgia Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Hawaii Commission No 
Idaho Commission Repealed 
Illinois Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Indiana Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Iowa Commission, Legislature, and Governor Yes 
Kansas Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Kentucky Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Louisiana Legislature, State Supreme Court (Gubernatorial veto) Yes 
Maine Commission, Legislature, and Governor Yes 
Maryland Legislature (Governor as back-up) No 
Massachusetts Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Repealed 
Michigan Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Yes 
Minnesota Legislature and Commission (gubernatorial veto) No 
Mississippi Legislature only (Commission as back-up) No 
Missouri Legislative Commission Yes 
Montana Commission Yes 
Nebraska Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Yes 
Nevada Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Yes 
New Hampshire Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
New Jersey Commission No 
New Mexico Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
New York Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
North Carolina Legislature only No 
North Dakota Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Yes 
Ohio Commission No 
Oklahoma Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Yes 
Oregon Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Repealed 
Pennsylvania Commission No 
Rhode Island Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
South Carolina Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
South Dakota Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Tennessee Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Texas Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Utah Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Repealed 
Vermont Legislature and Commission (gubernatorial veto) No 
Virginia Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Washington Commission Repealed 
West Virginia Legislature (gubernatorial veto) Repealed 
Wisconsin Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Wyoming Legislature (gubernatorial veto) No 
Source: Ballotpedia 2012 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: REDISTRICTING AND PARTISAN SYMMETRY 
In chapter one, I outlined three cases where individuals involved in 
drawing legislative or congressional districts stood to personally benefit from the 
maps that were eventually adopted and the resulting electoral outcomes. These 
cases were not exceptional; in states where legislatures draw legislative maps, 
legislators and their parties benefiting directly from the outcome of redistricting is 
ubiquitous. Gerrymandering—or accusations of gerrymandering—is 
commonplace. 
Two insights from public choice theory explain this phenomenon. The 
assumption that “all individuals, be they voters, politicians, or bureaucrats, are 
motivated more by self-interest than by public interest” calls into question 
legislators’ motivations when drawing electoral maps (Shughart 2008). Black’s 
findings that different systems of voting will yield different results in partisan 
terms (1958) give legislators the opportunity to indulge their personal and 
partisan motivations when drawing districts. Thus, we should expect self-interest 
to drive the reapportionment process. Although commissions, judges, and 
members of a council of state can all be assumed to have partisan preferences—
and thus a reason to engage in some level of self-interested gerrymandering—
they have no immediate personal stake in electoral outcomes at the district level. 
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In this chapter, I address the question: Can non-partisan commissions 
make district-level elections fairer? I expect elections will be fairer if the districts 
are drawn by non-legislative bodies, which have no personal stake in election 
outcomes, rather than legislators themselves, who are personally invested in the 
effects of redistricting. To test that hypothesis, I will look at the effects of 
districting practices on fairness—defined, in this work as partisan symmetry—by 
applying this concept at the district level. I will also consider the effects of legal 
constraints on districtors, including the Voting Rights Act, traditional districting 
principles, and judicial challenges. 
 
MEASURING ELECTORAL FAIRNESS 
Apportionment is a fundamentally important question for social scientists. 
But, a full account of the literature on apportionment and fairness requires an 
examination of several disciplines—from legal theory to political science. Given 
the complexity of the process, there are many ways to study redistricting. Various 
authors have studied the history of apportionment between the states (Balinski 
and Young 1982; McKay 1965; Schmeckebier 1941) and the relationship 
between legislative seats and citizen votes (Dahl 1956, 147-49; Farrand 1911; 
Locke 1965, 419-20; Rae 1967; Schattschneider 1942). Others have shown that 
changing patterns of partisanship have created opportunities for self-interested 
state legislatures to alter seats-votes relationships via gerrymandered 
congressional districts (Cain 1985; Grofman et al. 1982; Polsby 1971).  
Over the last 100 years, political scientists, economists, sociologists, 
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andmathematicians have studied these questions and attempted to create 
empirical estimates of bias and unfairness (Hay and Rumley 1984; Kendall and 
Stuart 1950; March 1957-58; Theil 1970; Tufte 1973). Scholars have examined 
redistricting’s link to the decline in the number of competitive seats in Congress 
and its effect on partisan balance in the House or Representatives. Some, like 
Mayhew (1971) and Tufte (1973), argued that the reapportionment cases 
contributed to the incumbency advantage and the vanishing of marginal districts.  
Others point out that merely reflecting underlying voter preferences—either 
directly or indirectly—is not enough for a system of representation to be fair and 
meaningful (Pitkin 1967, King and Ragsdale 1987). These observations paved 
the way to measuring winner-take-all systems with a new standard of fairness: 
partisan symmetry. 
Court challenges to political gerrymandering in the early 1980s rekindled 
interest in the relationship between seats and votes. However, little work has 
been done on apportionment within states—and work has only just begun on 
measuring partisan symmetry in state legislatures. Research on apportionment 
within the states is limited to isolated states and periods (Pildes and Niemi 1993; 
Dixon 1968; Schmeckebier 1941). Previous analyses on the partisan effects of 
redistricting by legislatures (see e.g. Abramowitz 1983 and Niemi and Winsky 
1992) focus on congressional rather than state house or senate districts, treating 
partisan balance as the only available measure of “fairness” (see also Born 
1985). Altman fills some of the gaps in his study of traditional districting principles 
(1998).  
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Bushman and Stanley (1971) found that malapportionment within states 
was largely reduced as a result of federal court actions during the 1960s, 
beginning with Baker vs. Carr (1962) and running through Reynolds v. Sims 
(1964). Cox (2004) points out that early studies of one-person, one-vote cases 
found few systematic policy effects. Cox and Katz (2002) argue that one-person, 
one-vote cases helped reduce the Republican bias in non-Southern 
congressional elections that existed into the 1960s. 
Other early work predicted both increased electoral competition (Jewell 
1969) and a shift in partisan balance in state legislatures (Hamilton 1967). The 
first study to address the partisan impact of reapportionment in state legislatures, 
which found that reapportionment usually helped Democrats (Erikson 1971) used 
data from congressional elections due to a lack of state data. Copeland and 
McDonald considered partisanship and redistricting in their 1987 study of 
reapportionment of state legislative races in Oklahoma. Among other 
hypotheses, they tested the theory that the impact of reapportionment should be 
more evident when it is developed in a primarily non-political manner. They 
found, not surprisingly, that gerrymandering and the political nature of the 
process, particularly prior to 1960, dominated the effects of the reapportionment 
in Oklahoma. 
In contrast, Gelman and King (1990) have found surprising benefits of 
legislative redistricting for American representative democracy, even if it results 
in partisan gerrymandering. Specifically, they found that redistricting increases 
responsiveness. They also confirmed that gerrymandering biases electoral 
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systems in favor of the party that controls the redistricting as compared to what 
would have happened if the other party controlled it, but any type of redistricting 
increases partisan symmetry as compared to an electoral system without 
redistricting.  
Scholars and journalists alike have pointed with alarm at computer 
programs that “can generate maps custom-fitted to meet any group's needs” 
(Buchman 2003, 119) allow mappers to “to specify a desired outcome… and 
have the program design a potential new district instantly” (Peck and Caitlin 
2004, page 50), or simply to “preordain” elections (Fund 2003). Legal scholars 
such as Pildes (1997), Karlan (1998), and Issacharoff (2002), worry about the 
astonishing precision of technology, which has led to increasingly sophisticated 
gerrymanders, causing incumbent entrenchment. Some observers claim that 
computers have qualitatively changed the redistricting process.  Altman, 
MacDonald, and McDonald (2005) analyzed the capabilities of redistricting 
software systems to develop a systematic qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of the nature and extent of the use of computer technology in 
redistricting. That research failed to uncover evidence that redistricting following 
the 2000 census was affected to any significant extent by “pushbutton” 
redistricting. They found, instead, “Current automated algorithms cannot 
simultaneously balance the multiple criteria that must be respected when drawing 
districts” (2005 p. 10). 
New technology has also produced unprecedented transparency in the 
redistricting process; under the direction of scholars at the Brookings Institution 
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and the American Enterprise Institute, and with consultation from an array of 
experts in redistricting issues, Michael McDonald and Micah Altman developed a 
set of principles for transparency and public participation. These principles have 
been endorsed by an array of stakeholders, including Common Cause and the 
League of Women Voters of the United States. They transformed these 
principles into the Public Mapping Project.  Using this tool, citizens can create 
their own redistricting plans to be compared with the politician-drawn maps. 
This evolution of measurement techniques parallels the development of 
our understanding electoral fairness. Increasing transparency in many states 
makes it possible to use these new techniques to accurately measure electoral 
outcomes for the past decade. 
 
CASE SELECTION 
States were chosen to maximize variation within several relevant 
categories—districting method; region, history, and culture; and whether the 
states in question were subject Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  
States with rules and practices that make measuring the effects of 
apportionment rules impossible were eliminated. Because term limits make the 
analysis of longitudinal data extremely difficult, no states employing them 
between 2000 and 2008 are used in the study. This leaves 33 states from which 
to choose. 
Multi-member districts were also eliminated. Although it is possible to 
measure partisan symmetry in states that use multi-member districts, their 
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inclusion would introduce complications, particularly in the upcoming analysis of 
competition (Chapter 4).  Most of the states chosen for the analysis do not use 
multi-member districts. North Carolina ended the practice of using multi-member 
districts in 2002. For the 2000 election data, I simply eliminated the 17 districts 
electing multiple legislators. Washington and New Jersey both use multi-member 
districts for state house elections, with each district electing two state house 
members and one state senator. For those states, I used state senate elections 
data. 
I also chose states in order to represent the widest variety of 
apportionment methods: Legislative apportionment by state legislature (with or 
without gubernatorial veto); apportionment by bipartisan redistricting commission; 
and hybrid models, epitomized by Iowa’s method (explained below). This work 
also looks at several instances wherein the usual apportionment methods were 
challenged. In those cases, final apportionment decisions were made, or 
approved, by courts or secretaries of state. 
The states are grouped in terms of region, history, and Elazar’s political 
culture: Mississippi, Alabama, and North Carolina, Washington and Oregon, Iowa 
and Indiana, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. When possible, one 
state’s reapportionment is directed by a commission and one state’s by the 
legislature in each set. In the Midwest set, Iowa is included, although it uses a 
hybrid system rather than a commission. In that part of the country, no state 
exists that uses a commission, but does not have term limits. 
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Washington has a bipartisan redistricting commission with four of the 
commissioners chosen by the legislature, while Oregon’s districts are usually 
drawn by the legislature with the Secretary of State serving as a back-up. After 
both the 1990 and 2000 census, Oregon legislators were unable to agree on 
redistricting plans; thus, the plans used in this study were drawn by the Secretary 
of State. 
In Indiana, all districts in all years were drawn by the legislature, with no 
court challenges; Iowa uses a hybrid commission and legislative method. In 
Iowa, the nonpartisan Legislative Services Bureau has initial responsibility for 
drawing apportionment plans. It must develop up to three plans that can be 
accepted or rejected by the legislature. Although the legislature has final 
responsibility for enacting a redistricting plan, they cannot alter plans—but they 
can send them back to the Legislative Services Bureau for alteration. 
In the Northeast/MidAtlanic, I have chosen three states: New Jersey, New 
York, and Rhode Island. The New York legislature is responsible for redistricting, 
while New Jersey’s reapportionment is handled by a bipartisan commission. In 
Rhode Island, the legislature is responsible for drawing redistricting maps. During 
the last round of redistricting (2000), the legislature appointed a redistricting 
commission consisting of house and senate members as well as civilian 
members. However, until legislation was passed in 2011, such a path was not 
required by law. Moreover, the commission merely recommends plans to the 
legislature, which may adopt, modify, or ignore the commission's proposals. The 
governor has veto power over congressional and legislative redistricting plans.  
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States in the south were particularly difficult to choose; the only Southern 
state with a commission (Arkansas) also has term limits. Therefore, I have 
chosen three states to address all variables: a commission, court case, and 
legislative districts. North Carolina has used districts drawn by Johnston County 
Superior Court Judge Knox Jenkins after a case alleging gerrymandering was 
remanded back to him from the North Carolina Supreme Court. The following 
year, Jenkins’ districts were redrawn by the legislature. Mississippi’s districts are 
drawn by a special redistricting commission—but only when the legislature fails 
to deliver maps by the redistricting deadline. During the period of this study, 
Mississippi’s districts were drawn by the Mississippi legislature. Alabama’s 
districts were challenged in court.  In all cases where there was a court 
challenge, none were brought on the basis of VRA violations. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE] 
States also vary by traditional districting principles such as contiguity, 
compactness, preservation of district cores, preservation of communities of 
interest, preservation of political subdivisions, and protection of incumbents. 
These principles are required either by state legislation or state constitutions. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE] 
Section 5 of the Act requires that the United States Department of Justice, 
through an administrative procedure, or a three-judge panel of the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia through a declaratory judgment action 
"preclear" any attempt to change “any voting qualification or prerequisite to 
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting..." in any 
"covered jurisdiction." (U.S. Department of Justice.)  
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Four of the states in this analysis are subject, at least partially, to 
preclearance. Every district in Alabama and Missisippi must be precleared by the 
justice department. Forty counties3 in North Carolina and three counties4 in New 
York must be precleared.  
Data on districts and elections are available from each state’s state board 
of elections. 
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 I expect that legislative redistricting will yield maps with a lower degree of 
partisan symmetry than will districts drawn by non-legislative bodies. In order to 
test that hypothesis, I measure partisan symmetry and model the relationship 
between redistricting method, traditional districting principles, judicial challenges, 
and partisan symmetry. 
 
Estimating Partisan Symmetry 
 Prior to the development of new modeling techniques, the concepts and 
measurements of bias and representation had often been conflated. King and 
Browning (1987) were the first to separate these two important concepts 
empirically in their general statistical model of votes and seats. Crucially, this 
work led to the development by Gelman and King (1994a) of the JudgeIt software 
                                                        
3
 Anson, Beaufort, Bertie, Bladen, Camden, Caswell, Chowan, Cleveland, Craven, Cumberland, 
Edgecombe, Franklin, Gaston, Gates, Granville, Greene, Guilford, Halifax, Harnett, Hertford, 
Hoke, Jackson, Lee, Lenoir, Martin, Nash, Northampton, Onslow, Pasquotank, Perquimans, 
Person, Pitt, Robeson, Rockingham, Scotland, Union, Vance, Washington, Wayne, Wilson 
4
 Bronx, Kings (Brooklyn), New York (Manhattan) 
 program: a method for assessing partisan symmetry
systematic error created by districting systems.
Gelman and King’s introduction of a new model for evaluating electoral 
systems and redistricting plans allowed them to estimate 
and electoral responsiveness of the U.S. House of Representatives since 1900 
and to evaluate the fairness of competing redistricting plans for the 1992 Ohio 
state legislature—finding, in that case, that reapportionment maps drawn by a 
non-partisan commission has a lesser degree of partisan bias than suggested 
maps drawn by both Republican and Democratic members of the legislature 
(Gelman and King 1994a). 
 Gelman and King’s 
systems featuring contests 
Republicans. I will use the
as the dependent variable in my analysis.
 Where Party 1 is Democrats, in any particular election year, 
of the two-party vote received by a Democratic candidate in district 
resulting vote share, in its simplest form, is modeled as:
where  is a vector of predictor variables with coefficient 
and  ~  are the systematic and
 is the total error variance, and 
error component (the portion of an election’s va
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 (lack of bias) by isolating the 
 
the partisan symmetry
 
JudgeIt theoretical model is used to describe electoral 
between two parties—in this case Democrats and 
 measure of partisan symmetry calculated by JudgeIt
 
vi is the share 
i. The 
 
 
β, and  ~ 
 random error terms. In this case, 
 is the share attributed to the systematic 
riation caused by properties of 
 
 
 
 the electoral system.) The error terms in each district are 
other and of those in each other district in the system.
 From this, the distribution of partisan symmetry
conditional on β and . Those distributions can then be used to determine a 
probability interval. 
 To get one draw from the distribution of partisan bias, the 
draws β and λ from their respective distributions. These represent conditions in 
the electoral system up until the election. It then calculates the mean and 
variance of the vote share in each d
it calculates the grand mean vote and subtracts it from 0.5; this is the value of 
used to adjust the mean vote to 0.5. 
share 
 
P(vi > 0.5 β,γ ,δ) for each district and takes the weighted mean. Twice the 
|weighted mean minus 0.5
this procedure yields the distribution of the partisan bias.
low levels of partisan symmetry (hi
indicates a perfectly symmetric system.
in Table 3.3. 
A similar district-level measurement, simply of 
meaningless; it would lack 
state as a whole. For example, North Carolina’s 1st Congressional district, if 
measured on its own, would look like a Democratic gerrymander, since any 
Democratic candidate running in the first is almos
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independent of each 
 
 can be estimated 
JudgeIt
istrict conditional on the draws β and 
JudgeIt then determines the expected seat 
| is the partisan bias conditional on β and λ.
 High scores indicate 
gh levels of partisan bias). A score of zero 
 Partisan symmetry scores are presented 
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 HERE] 
symmetry, would be 
the context that can only be provided by looking at a 
t certain to win. However, when 
 software 
λ. Next, 
δ 
 Repeating 
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seen in context, it’s clear that the district was intentionally packed with 
Democratic voters in order to make surrounding districts safe for Republicans—in 
other words, a Republican gerrymander. 
 In order to address this conundrum, I modify the state partisan 
symmetry score to allow for district-level variations. This variable is created by 
varying the state-level partisan bias measure by the variance from that mean in 
each district—represented here by calculating the difference between observed 
and expected vote totals in each district—where 0 indicates no partisan bias and 
1 indicates complete partisan bias. The result is a variable that captures both 
state-level and district-level variance in partisan symmetry. (Separating the two 
sources of variance into two different dependent variables would make it 
impossible to include all the possible sources of variance in one model. 
Population changes, for example, must be measured at the district level, while 
districting method and traditional districting principles must necessarily be state-
level variables. Moreover, variance from the mean only has context within a 
state—not between states.) 
In other words, the partisan bias variable is essentially a state-level 
measurement created by pooling district-level data into election series for each 
state, then modified by district. In my analysis, democratic party vote share and 
three other variables are included in order to get the most accurate measure of 
partisan bias.  
Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992) as well as Gelman and King (1994) provide 
the justification for the choice of explanatory variables. The presence of an open 
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seat is important because uncontested elections do not fit linear models unless 
explicitly controlled for. (Moreover, JudgeIt will not produce accurate 
measurements unless elections are controlled for contestedness.) An 
incumbency status variable is important in order to account for incumbency 
advantage; without such an indicator, election results will not fit the assumptions 
of a linear model with independent error terms. Including the incumbency 
variable also usually improves the predictive power of the model. As discussed in 
Gelman and King (1994a), it is also useful to note the party of each incumbent. 
DEMVOTE A district-level variable equaling the percentage of the vote earned  
  by the Democratic candidate [0-1] 
 
INC  A district-level variable denoting the party of the incumbent in each  
  district [1=Democrat, 0=No incumbent, -1=Republican] 
 
CONTEST A district-level variable denoting whether the race is contested  
  [1=Democratic Candidate Only, 0=Contested Election,  
  -1=Republican Candidate Only] 
 
TURNOUT A district-level variable equaling the total number of votes earned  
  by both the Democrat the Republican in each race. 
 
Additionally, the JudgeIt estimation of partisan symmetry includes the 
percentage of the vote earned by the Democratic candidate in the previous 
election (for any year not immediately following reapportionment.) In most states, 
this means that years 2000 and 2002 stand alone while years 2004-2008 include 
data from previous years. 
 
Redistricting Methods and Partisan Symmetry at the State Level 
In order to provide an adequate picture of partisan symmetry, it’s 
necessary to look at both the state and district levels. Although the data are 
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inadequate to perform a state-level analysis that accounts for special correlation, 
an examination of summary statistics reveals a clear relationship between 
redistricting method and partisan bias. As Table 3.4 shows, the mean partisan 
symmetry score for states using legislative redistricting is .1228. The mean 
partisan symmetry score for states using non-legislative redistricting is .0399. (A 
higher score indicates less symmetry/more bias.) A t-test confirms that there is a 
significant difference between these two scores. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.4 HERE] 
Further separating the data reveals an obvious pattern: states that use 
methods further removed from legislative and partisan concerns are more likely 
to have a high degree of partisan symmetry. Figure 3.1 shows partisan symmetry 
scores of all 41 states/years. Districts drawn by legislators, in general, have a 
lower degree of partisan symmetry than those drawn by commissions, members 
of the council of state, or judges. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 HERE] 
Before Gelman and King developed a model of partisan symmetry, seats-
votes curves were the standard method of evaluating the fairness of electoral 
systems. This standard measurement for comparing proportional systems of 
voting to plurality systems can be summarized by looking at the difference 
between seats won and votes won in a given state. If the difference is high, the 
system is not very proportional. Figure 3.2 shows three states: one with a low 
degree of partisan symmetry, one with some partisan symmetry, and one that is 
almost perfectly symmetric. (Graphs of systems in which there is a proportional 
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relationship between seats and votes will show the curve traveling through the 
origin of the graph.) The measurements of symmetry correspond relatively well to 
seats-votes curves. Symmetric systems translate (in most cases) to a very close 
relationship between votes and seats.  
However this does not always mean that a low degree of partisan 
symmetry exists in reality. In Rhode Island, for example, even a symmetric 
apportionment plan would yield a large difference between votes and seats won 
in the legislature. This is because of the demographic patterns in Rhode Island—
Democrats and Republicans are spread more-or-less uniformly across the state. 
In New York, on the other hand, where Democrats are concentrated near New 
York City and Republicans largely live upstate, a low degree of partisan 
symmetry yields a smaller difference in the seats-votes curve. 
As individuals have chosen to live in increasingly homogenous 
communities over the past three decades (Bishop 2008), the New York 
demographic model has become much more prevalent than that of Rhode Island. 
Bishop found that the number of counties in which the presidential election was 
competitive fell significantly from 1976 to 2008. These changing demographic 
patterns mean that the relationship between seats, votes, and partisan symmetry 
has become stronger over time—but also makes drawing asymmetric electoral 
districts much easier, creating more barriers to competitive elections. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3.2 HERE] 
Three seats-votes plots generated by JudgeIt illustrate the relationship. In 
Rhode Island in 2000, a state that leaves redistricting to legislators, the 
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difference between seats won and votes won is high. Although Democrats won 
approximately 68 percent of the vote, they received 85 percent of the seats in the 
state house of representatives. This corresponds to a high partisan symmetry 
score (.258). In Alabama, in which the legislature also draws the districts, the 
difference in seats and votes is smaller, as is the partisan symmetry score (.099). 
Democrats won approximately 53 percent of the vote and 58 percent of the seats 
in the state house of representatives. In Iowa, in which districts are created using 
a hybrid system, Democrats won approximately 53 percent of the votes and 55 
percent of the seats and scored .004 on partisan symmetry. 
 
Redistricting Methods and Partisan Bias at the District Level 
I expect to find that redistricting methods further removed from the 
legislature will produce more partisan symmetry than methods relying solely on 
legislative redistricting. I also expect that successful court challenges to 
redistricting plans will increase partisan symmetry.  
To test these hypotheses, I will model the relationship between partisan 
symmetry and redistricting methods at the district level. I will use a multi-level 
model with random effects for states (all variables are standardized): 
BIAS = DISTMETH + TDP + COURT + POPDEV + VRA + TRAD + INDIV + 
OPENSEAT + INC 
DISTMETH Redistricting Method. This variable will be defined by the body that  
  reapportions legislative seats—legislative or non-legislative.   
  [0=non-legislative, 1=legislative.] 
TDP  Traditional Districting Principles. A state-level variable denoting the  
  number of additional constraints on drawing districts, including  
  contiguity, compactness, etc. (See Table 3.2) [1-5] 
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COURT Presence of a court challenge. A state-level variable indicating the  
  influence of the court in a given election—including presence of a  
  court challenge and success of the challenge. [0-2] 
 
POPDEV Population Deviation. A district-level variable describing the degree  
  by which a single district's population varies from the ideal   
  population—relative to other districts in the state. Ideal district size  
  for the state house of representatives, for example, is determined  
  by dividing the total state population by the number of members in  
  either the that chamber. A score of 0 means no variation from the  
  ideal. A score of 1 means 100 percent variation from the ideal. In  
  light of Bishop’s (2008) findings, this variable could capture   
  changing population trends. 
 
INC  Incumbency. A district-level variable denoting whether there is an  
  incumbent running in the district. [0 = no incumbent,1 = incumbent] 
 
OPENSEAT Contested Election. A district-level variable denoting whether a seat 
  is contested, i.e. is there a candidate from each major party running 
  for the seat. [0 = contested, 1 = open seat] 
 
TRAD  State-level dummy indicating traditional political culture. 
 
INDIV  State-level dummy indicating individual political culture. 
 
PRESDUM A dummy variable indicating a presidential election year. 
 
VRA  Voting Rights Act. A district-level variable indicating districts that  
  are covered under Section 5 of the VRA. Section 5 of the Act  
  requires that the United States Department of Justice, through an  
  administrative procedure, or a three-judge panel of the United  
  States District Court for the District of Columbia, through a   
  declaratory judgment action "preclear" any attempt to  change “any  
  voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,  
  or procedure with respect to voting..." in any "covered  jurisdiction."  
  (U.S. Department of Justice.) 
  
RESULTS 
District-level analysis using a random effects model and a clustered robust 
standard errors model shows that, consistent with my hypotheses, redistricting 
method and involvement of the courts are important factors in explaining partisan 
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bias. Based on AIC scores, the random effects model (AIC: 7915.78) better fits 
the data than does the clustered robust standard errors model (AIC: 6048.49). 
Both models are good fits for the data, but show slightly different results. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.5 HERE] 
The variables that contribute most to partisan symmetry are measures of 
inputs into the creation of reapportionment maps. With the exception of 
population deviation and subsequent demographic changes, nothing that 
happens after maps are finalized, other than a legal challenge, can alter the 
partisan bias of a district—including usually powerful variables such as 
incumbency and whether a seat is contested.  
Redistricting method, with a coefficient of .2194 in the random effects 
model and .5520 in the clustered robust standard errors model, is a significant 
explanatory variable. The magnitude of this coefficient means that moving from a 
legislative to a commission system changes the amount of partisan symmetry 
considerably—almost from one endpoint of the observed range to the other. In 
the first model, it is significant at the .01 level; while in the second model, it is 
significant at the .05 level. These statistics are strong evidence that redistricting 
method contributes meaningfully to partisan symmetry. 
The random effects model shows population deviation, with a coefficient of 
.0199, as having a significant, but small, effect on partisan symmetry. Essentially, 
population variation only affects partisan symmetry at the margin. As population 
varies more from the ideal district size, districts become less symmetric. In the 
clustered robust standard errors model, population deviation is not significant. 
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Two state-level variables are also significant in the clustered robust 
standard errors model. One political culture variable is also significant; the 
clustered robust standard errors model shows that in states with a Traditional 
political culture, there is more partisan symmetry in redistricting maps—possibly 
because all of the states in this analysis with Traditional political culture are 
located in the South, where Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies. The 
coefficient on traditional political culture is -.3201. The variable is significant at 
the .05 level. The Voting Rights Act is also significant at the .05 level with a 
coefficient of .0985. Viewed together, these variables could be interpreted to 
mean that the imposed constraints of the Voting Rights Act improve symmetry 
overall, but negatively affect the particular districts to which they are applied 
(majority-minority districts). Neither variable is significant in the random effects 
model. 
Other variables—including traditional districting principles, whether it’s a 
presidential election year, incumbency, and whether an election is contested—
are not significant. Given Micah Altman’s findings (1998) that violations of 
traditional districting principles are politically harmless and Engstrom’s assertion 
(2009) that traditional districting principles are largely unenforced, it’s not 
surprising that districting principles exert no influence over partisan symmetry 
when considered in the same model with redistricting method. The lack of 
significance of contestation, incumbency, and presidential election years shows 
that redistricting method and other inputs to the redistricting process are robust 
even in the face of usually powerful control variables. 
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DISCUSSION 
 These findings are consistent with the literature and with my expectations. 
My results help to identify the effects of legislators’ strong personal interest in 
reelection. They also establish a relationship between redistricting and partisan 
symmetry, which was first suggested by Gelman and King (1994).  
 Individual legislators acting in pursuit of personal goals prefer districts that 
are extremely safe and, in general, comprised of the same constituents from year 
to year (Schaffner, Wagner, and Winburn 2004). These preferences give 
legislators strong incentives to gerrymander, motivations that are not present for 
commissioners, judges, or members of council of state. Those powerful 
incentives led me to expect a significant relationship between legislative 
involvement in the redistricting process and partisan symmetry. My results justify 
those expectations.  
 My results confirm the relationship between redistricting and partisan 
symmetry that Gelman and King first observed in their evaluation of competing 
redistricting plans for the 1992 Ohio legislature: that reapportionment maps 
drawn by commission have a higher degree of partisan symmetry than proposed 
maps drawn by members of the legislature (1994). My research extends their 
work by looking at redistricting across 10 states and multiple elections. 
  
UP NEXT 
 In the next chapter, I will look at the effects of partisan symmetry on 
competitiveness at the district level. I expect that partisan bias is an important 
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contributing factor to competitive elections, but not absolutely necessary for 
competition to exist. 
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Table 3.1: States Included in District-Level Partisan Symmetry Analysis 
State Years 
Redistricting 
Method 
Court 
Challenge 
Voting 
Rights 
Act Region 
Political 
Culture 
Alabama 2002           2006 
Legislature 
(gubernatorial veto) Yes Yes South Traditionalistic 
Indiana 
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
Legislature 
(gubernatorial veto) No No Midlands Individualistic 
Iowa 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006     
2008 
Hybrid No No Midlands Moralistic 
Mississippi 2003                     
2007 
Legislature (No  
veto, Commission as 
back-up) 
No Yes South Traditionalistic 
New Jersey 
2001          
2003          
2007 
Commission No No MidAtlantic Individualistic 
New York 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
Legislature 
(gubernatorial veto) No 
5 
Counties MidAtlantic Individualistic 
North 
Carolina 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
Legislature (no 
gubernatorial veto) Yes 
40 
Counties South Traditionalistic 
Oregon 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
Legislature 
(Secretary of State 
as back-up) 
No No Northwest Moralistic 
Rhode 
Island 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
Legislature 
(gubernatorial veto) No No Northeast Individualistic 
Washington 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
Commission No No Northwest Moralistic 
Source: United States Department of Justice (2012, Elazar (1972)  
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Table 3.2: Traditional Districting Principles 
  Compactness Contiguity 
Political 
Subdivisions 
Communities 
of Interest 
District 
Cores 
Protect 
Incumbents 
Alabama       
Indiana            
Iowa       
Mississippi          
New Jersey       
New York          
North 
Carolina       
Oregon         
Rhode Island       
Washington        
 Required  Prohibited  Required since 2002 
 69 
Table 3.3: Partisan Symmetry at the State Level 
State Year 
Partisan 
Symmetry 
AL 2002 0.113 
AL 2006 0.099 
IA 2000 0.086 
IA 2002 0.016 
IA 2004 0.059 
IA 2006 0.004 
IA 2008 0.023 
IN 2002 0.047 
IN 2004 0.024 
IN 2006 0.005 
IN 2008 0.029 
MS 2003 0.102 
MS 2007 0.119 
NC 2000 0.029 
NC 2002 0.008 
NC 2004 0.012 
NC 2006 0.056 
NC 2008 0.079 
NJ 2001 0.077 
NJ 2003 0.014 
NJ 2007 0.02 
NY 2000 0.188 
NY 2002 0.185 
NY 2004 0.168 
NY 2006 0.172 
NY 2008 0.222 
OR 2000 0.054 
OR 2002 0.106 
OR 2004 0.085 
OR 2006 0.048 
OR 2008 0.02 
RI 2000 0.258 
RI 2002 0.226 
RI 2004 0.162 
RI 2006 0.257 
RI 2008 0.15 
WA 2000 0.017 
WA 2002 0.039 
WA 2004 0.13 
WA 2006 0.021 
WA 2008 0.062 
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics on Partisan Bias, State-Level Data 
  
Legislative 
Redistricting 
Non-legislative 
Redistricting 
Mean 0.1228 0.0399 
Std. Dev. 0.0811 0.0326 
Min 0.005 0.004 
Max 0.258 0.086 
N 22 17 
Note: A difference of means test confirms that 
these scores are significantly different. 
 Figure 3.1: State-Level Partisan Bias and Redistricting Methods
71 
 
 72 
Figure 3.2: Seats-Votes Curves
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Table 3.5: Partisan Symmetry as a Function of Redistricting Method, Traditional 
Districting Principles, and Influence of the Courts 
Parameter 
Random 
Effects Model 
Clustered 
Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Constant 
-.0324    
(.1905) 
-.0089          
(.2300) 
DISTMETH 
 
.2194*** 
(.0294) 
.5520** 
(.1911) 
COURT 
 
.0691*** 
(.0242) 
-.0291 
(.0473) 
TDP 
 
.1569  
(.2462) 
.3941  
(.2940) 
VRA 
 
.0155 
(.0149) 
.0985**  
(.0404) 
POPDEV 
 
.0199*  
(.0112) 
-.0734  
(.0531) 
Political Culture  
TRAD 
 
.1320  
(.1749) 
-.3201*  
(.1717) 
INDIV 
 
.4381  
(.2954) 
.2591 
(.2155) 
INC 
 
.0102  
(.0100) 
-.0023  
(.0081) 
OPENSEAT 
 
.0020  
(.0102) 
.0294  
(.0155) 
PRESDUM 
 
-.005  
(.006) 
.004 
(.051) 
   
r-squared  .4204 
chi-squared 75.22  
N = 3443     
Stanard errors in parentheses. * significant at .1 
level, ** significant at .05 level, ***significant at .01 
level 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: PARTISAN SYMMETRY AND COMPETITION 
Despite the importance of fairness in electoral processes, most political 
actors, constituents, and even pundits don’t think in these terms, but in terms of 
electoral winners and losers. Moreover, for democratic elections to perform their 
intended function—providing citizens with accurate representation—fairness 
alone is insufficient. Meaningful electoral competition is the intervening step 
between a fair electoral process and representative outcomes. (Although it is 
theoretically possible for a large degree of both partisan symmetry and 
competition to result in a very weak relationship between seats and votes, in 
reality this does not happen.) 
Competition is necessary to keep American politics vibrant, responsive, 
and democratic. The legislative branch of government was designed by the 
Federalists in 1787 to be responsive and accountable; yet for many in North 
Carolina and around the country it is becoming stagnant and immune to 
constituents’ concerns. 
 McDonald and Samples chronicled many normative arguments favoring 
electoral competition in their book The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral 
Competition and American Politics (2006 Ch.1). They name liberty, equality and 
accountability, community concerns and constitutionality as arguments favorable 
to increasing competition in U.S. elections. 
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In this chapter, I’ll examine the effect of fairness—defined here as partisan 
symmetry—on electoral competition at the district level. Although other variables 
may be more proximate causes of competition, I expect that partisan symmetry 
helps to create an environment conducive to competition. 
 
REDISTRICTING AND COMPETITION 
Scholars have documented the relationship between redistricting and 
competition over the past several decades. Cain (1985) considered the 
differences among various districting methods, focusing on two types of 
districting plans: partisan and bipartisan. Partisan plans attempt to deprive the 
minority party of as many seats as possible, while bipartisan plans (passed 
through a typical legislative process) are drawn to make incumbents of both 
parties as safe as possible, preserving the balance of power and the political 
status quo (Lyons 2003). Bipartisan plans can be the consequence of divided 
government, which gives each party at least one veto point in the process 
(Krehbiel 1998). 
Butler and Cain (1992) and Hirsch (2003) examine alternatives to 
districting plans drawn by legislative bodies, including those drawn by courts and 
commissions. They argue that courts and commissions mostly focus on factors 
other than partisan politics—such as compactness, responsiveness, and 
accountability—whereas legislators focus primarily on partisan goals. They find 
that competitiveness, while not a goal of courts’ or commissions’ redistricting, is 
often a byproduct. 
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Carson and Crespin (2004) examined how differences in redistricting 
plans have affected the competitiveness of U.S. congressional elections. They 
found that the degree of electoral competition generally increases when 
commissions or courts are responsible for drawing new congressional districts. 
Moreover, they found a distinct pattern in partisan differences in redistricting 
strategy when Democratic or Republican controlled state governments sought to 
offset their minority party status in the U.S. House of Representatives. They 
found that effects varied when controlling for the number of seats gained or lost 
in each state. Schaffner, Wagner, and Winburn (2004) examined legislators’ 
motivations when redistricting, noting that elected members of legislative bodies 
have both their own personal reelection goals and direct ties to the political 
parties—perhaps resulting in conflicting goals. 
In Realities of Redistricting (2008), Winburn examines the factors that 
make it more likely for redistricting to determine electoral outcomes as well as the 
constraints and limits on the influence of redistricting. Using state legislative data 
from eight states in 2000 and 2002, he finds that the control of the process, 
control of government, use of traditional districting principles, potential court 
involvement, and the use of coterminous districts affect electoral outcomes. 
While his analysis reveals the importance of commissions and courts, it fails to 
examine reapportionment in the context of fairness. Winburn focuses on 
competition only: in a review of the book, Engstrom points out that his primary 
indicator of partisan gerrymandering is whether supporters of the majority party 
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are moved from that party’s safe districts into competitive districts and vice versa, 
regardless of the process (2009). 
Literature examining the relationship between redistricting and competition 
ignores redistricting’s outcomes, jumping directly from redistricting method to 
electoral competition. I introduce partisan symmetry as the essential intermediate 
step that links redistricting methods to electoral outcomes. 
 
MEASURING COMPETITION 
Researchers have developed numerous measures of party competition, 
notably V.O. Key’s examination of party competition in the South (1956). At the 
same time, scholars were expounding the basic tenet of theories of democracy 
(e.g. Dahl 1956, Downs 1957) that voters should have a choice between 
candidates for office. In the 1950s, competition was measured as the percentage 
of partisan victories from the 1890s to the 1950s for presidential, senatorial and 
gubernatorial election contests (Schlesinger 1955, Ranney and Kendall 1954). 
The conceptualization of party competition took shape in the 1960s with the 
works of Dawson and Robinson (1963), Hofferbert (1964) and Ranney (1965). At 
that time, party competition became a state-level measure defined as the 
"proportion of success," "duration of success," and "frequency of divided control" 
for the state legislative and gubernatorial levels of competition. Aistrup (1993) 
developed a county-level measure of state legislative party competition for the 
periods between 1968-73, 1974-79, and 1980-85 modeled on Ranney’s work. 
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Many political scientists have measured competition in its varying contexts 
(congressional, state level, and state legislative) through cross-sectional and 
longitudinal studies (e.g., Breaux and Jewell 1992; Cox and Morgenstern 1993; 
Ferejohn 1977; Garand and Gross 1984; Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993; Ranney 
1976; Ray and Havick 1981; Tidmarch, Lonergan, and Sciortino 1986; Van Dunk 
and Weber 1997; and Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991). 
Others have examined the causes and effects of uncontested seats in 
Congress and state legislatures (e.g. Fenno 1978, 233; Jacobson 1990, 46-49; 
Squire 1989; Wrighton and Squire 1997; Squire 2000), showing that 
competitiveness of the state’s electoral system contributes to incidence of 
uncontested seats across the states. They found that low levels of competition 
(and high rates of incumbent reelection) discouraged candidates from running for 
office, resulting in a large percentage of uncontested seats in any given election. 
 In the late 1960s, when the importance of party competition for 
representative democracy became a subject of intense debate, researchers first 
began defining party competition to mean the margin between votes cast for 
Democratic and Republican candidates for the U.S. House (Bond 1983) and the 
U.S. Senate (Fiorina 1974). At the district level, competition is generally 
measured using this principle: the difference in the percentage of votes won by 
the winning and losing candidates in an election. This is the measure that I use in 
this analysis. 
 
SOURCES OF COMPETITION IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 
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 Many political scientists have identified and tested conditions that give rise 
to legislative competition. The effects of a wide variety of variables have been 
examined, such as district level features (e.g. Fiorina 1974, Koetzle 1998), 
economic conditions (e.g. Born 1984, Campbell 1986), quality of candidates (e.g. 
Jacobson and Kernell 1981, Van Dunk 1997), spending on campaigns (e.g. 
Caldeira and Patterson 1982, Gierzynski and Breaux 1991, Giles and Pritchard 
1985, Jacobson 1978, Tucker and Weber 1993), and incumbency (e.g. Erickson 
1971, Garand 1991, Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991, Jewell and Breaux 1988, 
Mayhew 1974). Other political scientists examine a range of variables 
simultaneously using aggregate measures of competition (Barilleaux 1986; Cox 
and Morgenstern 1993; Patterson and Caldeira 1984; Van Dunk and Weber 
1997; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991). Many such studies estimate the long-
range effects of such factors as party organizational strength (Patterson and 
Caldeira 1984) and institutional characteristics (Van Dunk and Weber 1997; 
Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991). 
In his research on the sources of partisan competition, Hogan (2003) finds 
that a district’s characteristics, measured as social and partisan diversity, have a 
strong and durable influence on elections. He also reports that institutional 
characteristics such as legislative professionalism have a large influence, 
although the direction of their impact varies by stage of the electoral process 
examined. He concludes that district-level conditions have a large influence on 
competition; however, incentives created by institutional features are also critical 
for understanding the competitiveness of state legislative elections. Hogan’s 
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emphasis on institutional features invites inquiry into the effect of apportionment 
on partisan competition. 
 Previous research has demonstrated a strong relationship between 
incumbency and competition (Jewell and Breax 1998; Weber et al 1991). 
Incumbents win state legislative elections more than 90 percent of the time. 
Others have found that incentives to compete are necessary to competition, 
including legislative professionalism, legislative performance, and minority party 
strength.  
Many studies use a measure of legislative professionalism to examine the 
partisan implications for professionalized legislatures (Fiorina 1994). Legislators 
in more professionalized legislatures have more contact with their constituents 
(Squire 1993) and are more attentive to their concerns (Maestas 2000). More 
importantly, legislators enjoy electoral insulation from political tides as 
professionalization levels rise (Berry, Beckman, and Schneiderman 2000). 
Scholars have found that legislative professionalism affects the likelihood of 
competitive elections (Chubb 1988; Fiorina 1994; Rosenthal 1993; Weber et al. 
1991). Measures of professionalism used by these authors include member pay, 
session lengths, and staff and resources. These authors also believe that as 
legislatures become more professional, competition decreases. In an aggregate 
study of state legislative outcomes for the years 1942-1982, Chubb (1988) found 
that professionalism gives state legislators the resources to insulate themselves 
from electoral challenges. 
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Van Dunk and Weber (1997) showed that when a minority party is within 
reach of winning control of the chamber in the upcoming election, the party will 
make a concerted effort to win the additional seats. These incentives result both 
in increased contesting and possible marginality in the election. 
Weber et al. (1991) found a modest relationship between legislative 
performance (defined as legislative tax increases) and competition levels with 
legislative tax increases significantly related to marginal races in Ohio and to 
contested races in Iowa and Pennsylvania. Van Dunk and Weber (1997) 
confirmed that legislators are “punished” for some types of behavior by increased 
competition in the subsequent election. 
Table 4.1 shows these variables at the state level. 
[INSERT TABLE 4.1 HERE] 
 This table shows that there is considerable variation both within and 
across states on all variables. Minority party strength varies from .16 in Rhode 
Island in 2002 (a very weak Republican party) to .50 in New Jersey in 2007 
(equally strong parties). All states except Indiana had years of tax increases and 
of no tax increases. Indiana raised taxes every year from 2002 to 2008. 
Legislative professionalism varies from .184 in Indiana in 2002, representing an 
amateur, part-time legislature, to .912 in New York in 2000, a very professional, 
full-time legislature. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
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 I expect that partisan symmetry helps to create an environment conducive 
to competition. To test this hypothesis, I will model the relationship between 
partisan symmetry and competition at the district level between 2000 and 2008. 
Included in the model are the factors identified by Van Dunk and Weber (1997) 
as incentives for competition: incumbency, legislative professionalism, minority 
party strength, and legislative performance. I will also use a presidential dummy 
variable, since it may be systematically related to changes in marginality and 
contesting in my analysis.  
 I will use a multi-level model with random effects for states. This is 
necessary to account for special correlation within states. For comparison, I will 
also use a clustered robust standard errors model. The two models are 
somewhat similar. The clustered robust standard errors method of correcting the 
standard errors to account for the intraclass correlation is a somewhat weaker 
form of correction than using a multilevel model, which not only accounts for the 
intraclass correlation, but also corrects the denominator degrees of freedom for 
the number of clusters.  When using clustered robust standard errors, the 
denominator degrees of freedom is based on the number of observations, not the 
number of clusters.  Because variability in the predictors and residuals is 
removed when a multilevel model is used, the point estimates from this method 
are different than those obtained using the clustered robust standard errors 
model. 
 Both models include the following variables. All variables are 
standardized: 
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COMP = BIAS + INC + LEGPROF + LEGPERF + PRESDUM + MPS  
COMP Competition. This variable is a district-level variable defined as  
  the difference in percentage of votes won by the winner and loser in 
  each district. [0-1] 
 
SYM  Partisan Symmetry. This variable, as defined in Chapter 3, is a  
  district-level variable measuring the amount of partisan symmetry in 
  a district. [0-1] 
 
INC  Incumbent. This district-level variable indicates whether there is an  
  incumbent running for reelection in a given district. [0,1] 
 
LEGPROF Legislative Professionalism. This state-level variable is made  
  up of three components: member pay, session lengths, and staff  
  and resources. Member pay is measured as the annual   
  compensation for legislators as a proportion of median family  
  income. The  second measure is a simple measure of mean   
  session length for each two-year period. The third component is  
  measured as the number of staffers, full-time and session,   
  employed per constituent. Each component will accounts for one- 
  third of the variable. [Standardized 0-1] 
 
MPS  Minority Party Strength. This state-level variable will be measured  
  as the percentage of seats the minority party controls for a given  
  chamber in the period prior to the election. [0-1] 
 
LEGPERF Legislative Performance: To measure the relationship between  
  legislative performance and legislative competition, I will include a  
  variable measuring the enactment of increases in states taxes. Tax  
  increases will be coded 1; the absence of any tax increase will be  
  coded 0. (Source: The Tax Foundation 2012) 
 
PRESDUM Presidential election year. This is a presidential election year  
  dummy variable, included as a control factor. It is possible that  
  strong coattails effects of national presidential trends could swamp  
  the effect of partisan symmetry. [0,1] 
 
RESULTS 
A quick examination of summary statistics about competition in states 
using legislative and non-legislative redistricting methods shows that there is a 
difference in levels of competition between the two systems. The average 
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difference in percentages of votes won between winners and losers in states 
where legislators draw districts is .6254. In states where non-legislative bodies 
draw districts, the difference is .4561. A t-test confirms that there is significantly 
more competition in districts drawn by non-legislative bodies. Table 4.2 shows 
summary statistics for electoral competition. 
[INSERT TABLE 4.2 HERE] 
 Of the two full models—a multi-level model with random effects for states 
and a clustered robust standard errors model—the random effects model is a 
better fit for the data, based on AIC and BIC scores.  The random effects model’s 
AIC of 2940.72 and BIC score of 2996.02 are both lower than the scores of the 
clustered robust standard errors model (AIC: 3008.99, BIC: 3052.00). 
Nonetheless, the substantive results of the two models are fairly similar. 
[INSERT TABLE 4.3 HERE] 
 District-level analysis shows that, consistent with my hypotheses, partisan 
bias is a modest factor in explaining competition. In the random effects model, 
partisan bias is modestly significant at the .10 level and has a coefficient of 
.2345. This means that higher levels of partisan bias lead to larger differences in 
votes between winners and losers in elections—i.e. less competition. In the 
clustered robust standard errors model, the coefficient grows to .5039.  
 Looking at Indiana from 2002 to 2006 provides one example of the effect 
of partisan bias on competition. In 2002, Indiana’s partisan bias score was .047 
and the average difference between winners and losers in state house elections 
was 61.7 percentage points. In 2004, Indiana’s partisan bias score was .024 and 
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the observed average difference between winners and losers in state house 
elections was 56.9 percent. In 2006, Indiana’s partisan bias score was .005 and 
the average difference between winners and losers in state house elections was 
50.3 percent.  
 Comparing New York and New Jersey provides another demonstration. In 
New York, where partisan bias scores range from .168 to .222, the observed 
difference between winners and losers in the state house is more than 60 
percent in all years from 2000 to 2008. In New Jersey, where partisan bias 
scores range from .014 to .07, the observed difference between winners and 
losers in state senate elections is never more than 35 percent in any year from 
2001 to 2007. 
 Incumbency is also significant. With coefficients of .1984 in the first model 
and .1981 in the second, it is significant at the .01 level. This means that 
incumbency plays a large and influential role on competition at the district level—
the difference between the percentage of votes won by winners and losers in an 
election with an incumbent is much higher than in elections with no incumbent. 
This is unsurprising given incumbency’s important role in determining electoral 
outcomes and the historical rate at which incumbents win elections.  
 Legislative performance is significant at the .10 level in the clustered 
robust standard errors model—but in the opposite direction than expected: tax 
increases are correlated with less competitive elections. It is possible that the 
measurement of tax increases as a dummy variable—which treats large income 
tax increases the same as small changes in sales taxes or automatic changes in 
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gas taxes—is too blunt an instrument to capture the true effects of tax increases 
on competition. 
 As shown in Table 4.3, other variables that have been shown to contribute 
to competition are not significant in either model. Although I expect minority party 
strength plays a role in the relationship between redistricting, partisan symmetry, 
and competition, it may be the case that party strength, which changes little over 
time within states, contributes to the outcomes of the redistricting process—
making any additional contribution to competition too small to measure. 
 It is unclear why presidential elections and legislative professionalism do 
not influence competition in this model. Regardless, both variables have very 
small coefficients, indicating that even if they were significant, the effects would 
be of very little consequence.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 This research fills a missing causal linkage in research by Carson and 
Crespin (2004) and Winburn (2008). Those authors have shown that redistricting 
affects electoral competition—but not the way in which that relationship happens. 
My work shows that the intermediate step between redistricting and electoral 
competition is partisan symmetry. 
 The finding that partisan symmetry contributes to competition is important 
because healthy electoral competition bolsters democracy, improves 
representation and accountability, helps ensure that citizens can enjoy more 
liberty, and ensures the basic tenet of equality in elections: one-person, one vote. 
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Competition is necessary to keep American politics vibrant, responsive, and 
democratic. Improving competition will also produce voters who are more 
interested in elections, better-informed on issues, and more likely to turn out to 
the polls.  
 These findings give reformers in states with legislative redistricting a clear 
path to creating more competition in the electoral process: changing redistricting 
methods. Responsible redistricting is one method of improving competition that 
citizens and reformers can pursue. 
 In chapters three and four, I have established that redistricting process 
contributes to partisan symmetry and additionally that partisan symmetry 
contributes at the margins to electoral competition. Given the powerful 
relationship between incumbency and competition, it is noteworthy to have found 
even a modest correlation between partisan bias and competition.  
 
UP NEXT 
 In the next chapter, I’ll examine redistricting, partisan bias, and 
competition in North Carolina, where court challenges caused districts to change 
more frequently than is usual. In addition to examining the electoral history and 
outcomes from 2000 to 2008, I’ll look at political actors’ intentions and 
motivations in creating and challenging redistricting plans to discover how they 
view fairness and competition at the state level. 
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Table 4.1: Electoral Competition: State Level Variables 
State Year 
Minority 
Party 
Strength 
Legislative 
Performance 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
Alabama 2002                     2006 
.34 
.42 
0 
1 
.382 
.389 
Indiana 
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
.46 
.43 
.45 
.48 
1 
1 
1 
1 
.184 
.188 
.203 
.216 
Iowa 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
.44 
.49 
.49 
.47 
.45 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
.500 
.496 
.493 
.486 
.490 
Mississippi 2003                     2007 
.27 
.40 
1 
1 
.275 
.274 
New Jersey 
2001          
2003          
2007 
.40 
.45 
.50 
0 
1 
1 
.608 
.640 
.599 
New York 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
.33 
.37 
.37 
.33 
.29 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
.912 
.900 
.878 
.846 
.814 
North 
Carolina 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
.45 
.48 
.48 
.48 
.48 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
.292 
.369 
.369 
.358 
.347 
Oregon 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
.47 
.47 
.45 
.47 
.45 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
.484 
.478 
.472 
.468 
.474 
Rhode 
Island 
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
.16 
.27 
.31 
.25 
0 
1 
0 
1 
.464 
.470 
.474 
.472 
Washington 
2000          
2002          
2004          
2006          
2008 
.45 
.47 
.47 
.45 
.41 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
.548 
.540 
.539 
.524 
.533 
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Table 4.2: Competition Summary Statistics 
  
Legislative 
Redistricting 
Non-legislative 
Redistricting 
Mean 0.6254 0.4561 
Std. Dev. 0.3749 0.3846 
Min 0.008 0.008 
Max 1 1 
N 2342 1001 
Note: A difference of means test confirms that 
these scores are significantly different. 
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Table 4.3: Competition as a function of Partisan Bias 
 
  
Random 
Effects 
Model 
Clustered 
Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
BIAS 
.0514*  
(.0282) 
.1105*  
(.0527) 
INC 
.1939*** 
(.0164) 
.1935*** 
(.0313) 
LEGPROF 
-.1044  
(.0803) 
-.0856  
(.0479) 
LEGPERF 
.0014  
(.0186) 
.0295*  
(.0146) 
MPS 
-.0248  
(.0409) 
-.0807  
(.0643) 
PRESDUM 
-.0118  
(.0289) 
-.0029 
(.0191) 
Constant -0.0289 0.0058 
   
chi-squared 143.87  
r-squared  0.0627 
   
AIC 2940.72 3008.99 
BIC 2996.02 3052 
   
N=3443     
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 
.1 level, ** significant at .05 level, ***significant 
at .01 level 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: REDISTRICTING IN NORTH CAROLINA 2000-2010 
In this chapter, I will examine North Carolina’s experiences with 
redistricting from 2001-2010. I will measure district characteristics before and 
after each redistricting change and use interviews and newspaper reports of 
political elites who participated in or observed the political process that produced 
each set of redistricting maps.  This round of redistricting will be particularly 
interesting as a topic for study because of the controversy surrounding it and the 
several iterations of new voting maps before elections actually occurred, in 
addition to an special interim map used only in the 2002 elections.  The changes 
in districts—from 2000 to 2002, from 2002 to 2004, and again before the 2010 
primaries—make this century’s earliest elections in NC a perfect case study in 
competition and district effects in elections. Considerable partisan controversy in 
the North Carolina General Assembly makes this issue especially topical.  
Moreover, accurate data about partisan symmetry and competition will be useful 
to understand future redistricting efforts in North Carolina. 
 
HISTORY 
From 2000 to 2004, a series of state legislative elections took place in 
North Carolina using three distinct sets of legislative maps, two drawn by the NC 
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legislature and one drawn by a Superior Court judge. In 2008, those maps were 
again changed in response to a lawsuit filed in 2007. 
Controversy has been the defining characteristic of North Carolina’s 
recent redistricting history. Throughout the 1990s, North Carolina was the focus 
of several of federal lawsuits challenging alleged race-based congressional 
districts. In those suits, the courts ruled that racial gerrymandering is 
unconstitutional but partisan gerrymandering is not. These suits paved the way 
for state-level redistricting challenges beginning in 2002. 
In mid-November 2001, a coalition of most North Carolina House and 
Senate Democrats, plus a few Republicans, finished redrawing legislative 
districts. On Nov. 13, Republican party activists filed a lawsuit in state court 
charging that the maps violated the state constitution by unnecessarily splitting 
counties. The court ultimately hearing the case—the N.C. Supreme Court—was 
held at the time by a 5-2 Republican majority. 
Republicans’ complaints about the 2001 maps were myriad:  
• Many counties and municipalities were split among multiple 
districts.  
• For the most part, voters had no common frame of reference or any 
sense that they shared a community of interest with others in their 
districts.  
• The maps largely ignored the “one person one vote” rule—not to 
preserve county lines or respect communities of interest, but, 
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according to the plaintiffs, simply to maximize the number of 
Democrats elected. 
The court heard the case, Stephenson v Bartlett, in April of 2002.  Five of 
the seven members of the N.C. Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs were 
correct in their assertion that House and Senate maps drawn by the Democrat-
controlled General Assembly had violated the state constitution's provision 
against splitting counties. The 2001 Senate Redistricting Plan divided 51 of 100 
counties into different Senate districts and the 2001 House Redistricting Plan 
divided 70 out of 100 counties into different House districts. 
All five members in this majority were Republicans, and the decision was 
written by Chief Justice Beverly Lake. Four of the five justices ruled that, in 
reality, the county-line provision doesn't always apply to legislative redistricting, 
even in counties outside the jurisdiction of the federal Voting Rights Act. They not 
only rejected the idea of multi-county, multimember districts as a remedy for the 
Democrats' unconstitutional gerrymander, but they actually ruled that such 
districts are themselves unconstitutional unless there is a "compelling state 
interest" at stake—which was apparently so strict a test as to invalidate not just 
proposed new multimember districts but all of the existing ones (Stephenson v 
Bartlett 2002). 
This smaller majority found that multimember districts violated another 
provision of the state constitution, this one involving equal protection under the 
laws. In doing so, they essentially found that the equal-protection clause 
canceled out the whole-county clause when the latter would appear to require 
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multimember districts in order to keep districts as equivalent as possible in 
population. 
Republican Robert Orr went in a different direction, arguing that the 
majority had accepted an argument—that the equal protection clause prevents 
multi-county districts and thus invalidates the plaintiffs' proposed remedy as well 
as, at least partly, the whole-county provision—even though "no party raised 
such an issue at trial, nor did anyone argue such an issue to this court" 
(Stephenson v Bartlett 2002). The two dissenting Democrats, Sarah Parker and 
G.K. Butterfield, argued that the Republican majority was engaging in a 
legislative rather than a judicial act. 
On May 7, Johnston County Superior Court Judge Knox Jenkins held a 
hearing in the Stephenson v. Bartlett case that was remanded back from the N.C. 
Supreme Court, the majority of which gave Jenkins the authority to set a 
timetable for a new round of legislative redistricting. After the General Assembly 
failed to produce new maps, Jenkins drew new districts himself, with the aid of 
redistricting experts. 
Jenkins plans made the following modifications to the legislative plan, 
(Sutton 5): 
1. In Iredell County, Districts 95 and 96 were redrawn to run east-
west, thereby respecting the boundaries of Statesville and 
Mooresville. 
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2. In Moore County, which anchors District 52, the county seat, 
Carthage, was added to its “home” District 52, removing it from 
District 51, which is anchored in Lee County. 
3. In Guilford County, the City of High Point had been split among four 
districts (57, 60, 61 and 62). Jenkins’ plan eliminated one split that 
involved District 60, while maintaining the acceptable population 
variance (±5%) of the four districts. 
4. The Court modified District 18 to increase its percentage of African 
American population from 44.00% to 46.99%. 
5. District 113 was changed to encompass the southern tier of 
Transylvania, Henderson and Polk Counties running east-west. 
6. In Onslow County, District 14 was modified slightly to increase its 
compactness. 
House Speaker Jim Black and Senate leader Marc Basnight (both 
Democrats) later persuaded the State Board of Elections to file suit in federal 
court to seek invalidation for Jenkins' maps.  
On June 27, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court in Washington 
rejected this attempt by North Carolina Democrats to invalidate legislative 
districts drawn by Jenkins and to reinstate their 2001 legislatively drawn maps. 
The judges were all Democrats, appointed by Democratic presidents. 
On the week of July 11, 2002, Jenkins maps cleared another hurdle when 
the U.S. Justice Department ruled that the interim legislative districts drawn up by 
Jenkins complied with Section 5 of the federal Voting Rights Act in North 
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Carolina’s 40 affected counties5. Jenkins maps were used in primary and general 
elections in 2002. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court issued yet another ruling the week of 
July 16, 2003. In upholding the 2002 finding by Judge Jenkins, the 4-1 decision 
of the high court sent the matter back to the General Assembly for another round 
of map-drawing. In effect, the Supreme Court ordered legislators to go back to 
the drawing board and to employ neutral rules in fashioning House and Senate 
districts to last until 2010. They agreed with the trial court that the second set of 
maps the lawmakers drew in 2002 (maps labeled as Sutton 3) had been a  
gerrymander. 
In early September 2003, Stephenson v Bartlett plaintiffs returned to the 
trial court in Johnston County with a motion to amend their complaint. They 
requested Judge Jenkins to intervene to force legislative leaders to draw new 
House and Senate districts before early November. Failing that, they wanted 
Jenkins to draw the districts himself – districts that would be in place for the rest 
of the decade. The plaintiffs lost the battle on Thursday, Sept 23. Jenkins stated 
in his decision that it was impossible for the plaintiffs to establish that the 
legislature’s impasse over redistricting justified judicial intervention, since the 
legislature hadn’t yet met to redraw the maps since the 2001 versions were 
rejected. 
                                                        
5
 Anson, Beaufort, Bertie, Bladen, Camden, Caswell, Chowan, Cleveland, Craven, 
Cumberland, Edgecombe, Franklin, Gaston, Gates, Granville, Greene, Guilford, Halifax, 
Harnett, Hertford, Hoke, Jackson, Lee, Lenoir, Martin, Nash, Northampton, Onslow, 
Pasquotank, Perquimans, Person, Pitt, Robeson, Rockingham, Scotland, Union, Vance, 
Washington, Wayne, Wilson 
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In November 2003, during a special legislative redistricting session, 
members of the North Carolina General Assembly redrew their districts yet again. 
Both the Senate and House maps made only minor adjustments on the interim 
maps ordered by Jenkins in 2002. 
The General Assembly ratified the 2003 redistricting plans as part of 
House Bill 3 on November 25, 2003. The Governor signed the bill that same day 
as Session Law 2003-434. The maps were effective from 2004 to 2008.  
In August 2007, Pender County commissioners filed a lawsuit challenging 
the constitutionality of state House districts 16 and 18 on the grounds that those 
districts were created by unnecessarily splitting counties. 
In 2009, the House Redistricting Plan was again modified by House Bill 
1621. That bill was ratified by the General Assembly on June 11, 2009, and 
became law as Session Law 2009-78. The plan was precleared by the U.S. 
Justice Department under Section 5 on September 18th, 2009. The bill amended 
the House Redistricting Plan only by changing districts 16 and 18 in Pender and 
New Hanover counties. 
[INSERT TABLE 5.1 HERE] 
 
 Table 5.1 reveals that relationships established in chapters three and four 
also apply in North Carolina. Although the differences between maps are small, 
in terms of both partisan symmetry and competition, the pattern remains: maps 
with less partisan bias yield more competition. 
 
Timeline 
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EARLY 2001   Sutton House Plan 3 gains preclearance from United  
   States Department of Justice 
 
13 NOVEMBER 2001   Stephenson v. Bartlett is filed 
 
19 NOVEMBER 2001   Defendants remove case to the United States District  
   Court for the  Eastern District of North Carolina 
 
15 FEBRUARY 2002   Defendants represent to Superior Court that there  
   was insufficient time for the General Assembly to  
   promulgate a redistricting plan 
 
20 FEBRUARY 2002   Superior Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for summary  
   judgment 
 
4 APRIL 2002   Stephenson v Bartlett heard in Special Session in the  
   North Carolina Supreme Court 
 
7 MAY 2002    Johnston Superior Court Judge Knox Jenkins holds a  
   hearing on Stephenson v. Bartlett 
 
8 MAY 2002    Superior Court accorded first opportunity to draw new  
   redistricting plans to the State House and the State  
   Senate 
 
17 MAY 2002   Redistricting plans denoted “Senate Plan-Fewer  
   Divided Counties” and “House Plan-Sutton 5” were  
   passed by a majority of the House and Senate 
 
20 MAY 2002   Deadline for House and Senate to submit plans to  
   Superior Court 
 
22 MAY 2002   Superior Court concludes its review of “Senate Plan- 
   Fewer Divided Counties” and “House Plan-Sutton 5”  
   and submits “Interim House Redistricting Plan for  
   North Carolina 2002 Elections” 
 
JUNE 2002    NC State Board of Elections files suit in federal court  
   to seek approval for Jenkins’ maps 
 
27 JUNE 2002   Three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court in   
   Washington validate Jenkins’ legislative districts 
 
11 JULY 2002   U.S. Justice Department rules that Jenkins’ maps  
   comply with Section 5 of the VRA 
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2002     Primary Election (Jenkins’ maps used) 
 
2002     General Election (Jenkins’ maps used) 
 
16 JULY 2003   North Carolina Supreme Court orders legislators to  
   redraw maps 
 
SEPTEMBER 2003   Stephenson v Bartlett plaintiffs return to trial court in  
   Johnston County to demand legislative leaders to  
   draw new House and Senate districts before early  
   November  
 
23 SEPTEMBER 2003  Jenkins denies plaintiffs’ demands 
 
NOVEMBER 2003   Members of the North Carolina General Assembly  
   redraw districts in a special legislative session 
 
25 NOVEMBER 2003   General Assembly ratifies new districts as part of  
   House Bill 3. Governor signs bill as SL 2003-434. 
 
AUGUST 2007   Pender County commissioners file a lawsuit   
   challenging the constitutionality of House districts 16  
   and 18 
 
11 JUNE 2009   House redistricting plan is modified by House Bill  
   1621 to change districts 16 and 18 
 
18 SEPTEMBER 2009  U.S. Justice Department preclears new districts under 
    Section 5 of the VRA 
 
RULES FOR REDISTRICTING 
 Federal rules, state rules, and North Carolina’s constitution provide 
guidelines for redistricting. According to the website of the North Carolina 
General Assembly, North Carolina’s redistricting process is subject to five 
principal rules, described on the North Carolina General Assembly website. 
These rules provided the basis for court challenges to legislative maps. 
• One person must equal one vote: Each district that elects one 
representative to a legislative body is required to be at least approximately 
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equal in population to every other such district. For State House and State 
Senate districts, the State Supreme Court has said that means that no 
district may deviate from the average district population size by more than 
5%. The State Supreme Court, in its 2002 Stephenson v. Bartlett decision, 
interpreted the State Constitution as having a presumption that all districts 
in House and Senate must be single-member districts. 
• Consideration of Minorities: The Voting Rights Act and various court 
cases decided under it forbid drawing districts that dilute minority voting 
strength. For the 40 counties in North Carolina covered by Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, this means avoiding "retrogression," or worsening the 
position of racial minorities with respect to the effective exercise of their 
voting rights. All 100 counties are subject to Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, which may require drawing districts which contain a majority minority 
population if three threshold conditions are present: 
o a minority group is large enough and lives closely enough together 
so that a relatively compact district in which the group constitutes a 
majority can be drawn 
o the minority group has a history of political cohesiveness or voting 
as a group, and 
o the white majority has a history of voting as a group sufficient to 
allow it to usually defeat the minority group's preferred candidate.  
The totality of circumstances, including a past history of discrimination that 
continues to affect the exercise of a minority group's right to vote, must 
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also be taken into consideration. These rules come from Thornburg v. 
Gingles, a landmark US Supreme Court Voting Rights Act case arising 
from North Carolina in the 1980s. 
• Impermissible Consideration of Race: The General Assembly and its 
redistricting plans are also subject to lawsuits if considerations of race 
impermissibly dominate the redistricting process. This may occur when 
non-compact majority-minority districts are drawn in such a manner that 
traditional redistricting principles, such as compactness, contiguity, 
respect for political subdivisions or communities of interest, are 
substantially ignored. Where the Voting Rights Act threshold factors exist, 
a majority-minority district may be justified if it is tailored to address the 
threshold factors. These rules come from Shaw v. Reno, another 
landmark US Supreme Court case arising from North Carolina in the 
1990s. Obviously, abiding by both sets of rules regarding race can be a 
challenge. 
• Districts Must Be Contiguous: Under the State Constitution, Senate and 
House districts must consist of contiguous territory. By tradition, the 
contiguity requirement also has been applied to Congressional districts. 
Contiguity means that all parts of a district must touch. The district must 
not have any detached parts. 
• Division of Counties Must Be Minimized: Article II of the State 
Constitution says that in drawing State House and Senate districts, no 
county shall be divided. In 1981, the US Department of Justice said that 
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requirement was inconsistent with the Voting Rights Act, so the General 
Assembly disregarded it for 21 years. The in 2002 the State Supreme 
Court in the case of Stephenson v. Bartlett said the "Whole County 
Provision", found in the State Constitution must be honored to the extent it 
can be honored, consistent with the Voting Rights Act and other State and 
federal precepts. The Stephenson decision for the first time said the equal 
protection clause of the State Constitution contained a presumption for 
single-member legislative districts, and that presumption should be a 
limitation on the Whole County Provision. The US Justice Department 
approved the Stephenson opinion and withdrew its 1981 objection to the 
Whole County Provision. The Court in Stephenson prescribed a step-by-
step method for harmonizing the Whole County Provision with the other 
laws. First, the General Assembly should draw the districts required by the 
Voting Rights Act. Second, it should take all the counties with just the right 
population to be single-member districts and make them one-county 
single-member districts. Third, it should take all the counties that have just 
the right populations for one or more districts and divide those counties 
into compact single-member districts. Fourth, for the remaining counties it 
should group them into clusters of counties and divide the clusters into 
compact single-member districts, crossing county lines within the cluster 
as little as possible. (North Carolina General Assembly) 
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NORTH CAROLINA REDISTRICTING GOALS: FAIRNESS, COMPETITION, AND 
PARTISANSHIP 
 In order to identify the goals of major participants in the North Carolina 
redistricting process and judicial struggle, I examined newspaper accounts from 
the time and also conducted interviews with some of the actors. 
In my examination of newspapers and in interviews of major players in 
North Carolina’s 2001-2004 redistricting battles, I looked at partisan actors’ goals 
in redistricting, partisan (and non-partisan) actors’ definitions of fairness, whether 
competitiveness and fairness are conflated, and actors’ views on reform efforts. 
These interviews and newspaper accounts helped me answer the question of 
whether partisans and reformers would be satisfied with fair elections that are not 
competitive (and vice versa). 
 
Interview Methodology 
 I chose to focus on the Stephenson v. Bartlett case as a starting point for 
interviews. I attempted to contact everyone involved in the case, including 
plaintiffs (Ashley Stephenson, Leo Daughtry, Partick Ballentine, and Bill Cobey); 
defendants (Gary O. Bartlett, Larry Leake, Robert O. Cordle, Genevieve C. Sims, 
Lorraine Shinn, and Charles Winfree); the judges (Superior Court Judge Knox 
Jenkins and former Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake); and members of the media 
(Barry Smith, Mitch Kokai, and Josh Ellis) and reform groups (Chris Fitzsimon 
and John Hood) that covered the case. I also interviewed two legislators (Andrew 
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Brock and Peter S. Brunstetter) who proposed alternatives to the legislative 
process that lead to the Stephenson court challenge. 
 I contacted all the possible interview candidates either by email or letter or 
both. Six of the candidates responded positively to my interview requests: Patrick 
Ballentine, Bill Cobey, Peter Brunstetter, Mitch Kokai, Barry Smith, and John 
Hood. Robert O. Cordle responded (as a spokesperson for the defendants), 
stating that the State Board of Elections had no substantive comments on the 
case. The first three are partisan Republican actors (either current or former 
politicians). Mitch Kokai and Barry Sanders covered the case for News 14 
Carolina and Freedom Communications, respectively. John Hood commented on 
the case as part of his work at the conservative John Locke Foundation (where I 
once interned). It is possible that my association with the Foundation and the 
conservative community is part of the reason that no Democratic partisans or 
liberal reformers agreed to interviews. 
Interviews took place from March 1, 2010 through December 2011. 
Interviews were conducted in person, over the phone, and via email. No audio or 
video recordings were made; extensive typed and hand-written notes were used 
to record interviews. Interviews generally lasted from 30 minutes to one hour. 
Newspaper accounts were published between January 2001 and December 
2003. Interview questions are included in Appendix B. 
 
Interview Findings 
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 Newspaper accounts and interviews with stakeholders in North Carolina’s 
redistricting process have revealed that political elites have distinct ideas of 
competitiveness and fairness, but believe that fair procedures contribute largely 
to competitive elections. Both partisan and non-partisan actors believe that 
fairness is a procedural goal, while competition is simply an outcome—for the 
most part a desirable one. Partisan actors, particularly those in the minority party, 
see fair procedures as a hedge against gerrymandering (by the other party) and 
as a means to an end: electoral competitiveness. Across the board, political 
elites believe that redistricting reform is desirable, but unlikely; motivations for 
desiring reform range from partisan political interests to “good government” 
sensibilities. 
 
Definitions of Fairness 
 Both partisan actors and non-partisan observers of North Carolina’s 
redistricting process cited redistricting rules—including one-man-one-vote, whole 
county, and contiguity provisions—as indicators of fairness. NC Senator Peter S. 
Brunstetter (R-Forsyth), sponsor of “An Act to amend the constitution of North 
Carolina To establish the Hamilton C. Horton Independent Redistricting 
Commission” believes that fair redistricting processes and competitive elections 
are imperative for democracy to function; “When you have [uncompetitive 
elections], the legislature becomes unaccountable. Legislators gain entrenched 
power positions. Democracy becomes unresponsive. The majority of legislators 
represent a minority of preferences.” 
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 Bill Cobey, former chairman of the North Carolina Republican Party and 
one of the plaintiffs in Stephenson v. Bartlett, explained his view of the whole 
counties provision by saying, “it’s helpful for [representatives] and constituents. 
[Without the provision], people don’t know who’s representing them.” In addition 
to the whole county provision, he said that contiguity and compactness are 
important: “A district shouldn’t look like you’ve pulled out enough votes 
specifically to affect elections. [A district] should look like it makes sense. You 
can look at it and see that it looks reasonable.” He also cited communities of 
interest as a principle by which districts should be drawn. 
 Art Pope, a former Republican N.C. House member and one of the 
plaintiffs in Stephenson, cited “traditional redistricting common sense” as one 
way to look at whether maps are fair (2001). In the Mount Airy News, Pope cited 
lack of debate and the violations of the whole county provision as evidence that 
North Carolina’s districts were unfair: “The big D Democrats do not like small D 
democracy.” Pope said the Democratic House plan “slices and dices” the 
counties it does divide, often putting them into three or four districts (2002).   
 John Hood, president of the non-profit John Locke Foundation in Raleigh, 
NC, poses a question to gauge fairness in redistricting: “Can the voters choose 
their representatives or are their votes constrained by the maps. The more you 
can let voters decide who represents them, the more fair. It’s ultimately not about 
the candidates—it’s about the voters. What’s fair to candidates doesn’t matter, 
the voters’ power matters.” 
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 Mitch Kokai, chief state government reporter for News 14 Carolina at the 
time of Stephenson v. Bartlett, defined fairness based on legal principles: “…‘fair’ 
maps would comply with the legal and constitutional restrictions applied to the 
redistricting process. It’s my understanding that the restrictions include: the 
requirement that each district include roughly the same number of people, so that 
each representative represents the same number of constituents and each 
senator represents the same number of constituents; the requirement that 
districts be as compact as possible, to ensure that legislators live as close as 
possible to the people they represent; the requirement that counties remain intact 
for voting-district purposes to the greatest extent possible; and the requirement 
that North Carolina’s maps comply with current federal restrictions linked to court 
cases involving voting rights.” He further explained that truly fair maps are ends-
independent: “‘Fair’ maps don’t boost the likelihood that a particular party will win; 
neither do they guarantee that the party in power can thwart the will of the 
people. Voters should choose their elected leaders; elected leaders should have 
very little leeway in choosing the voters who will cast ballots for or against them.” 
 Barry Smith, Raleigh Bureau Chief for Freedom Communications, added 
that incumbency protection should not be a part of “fair” redistricting processes. 
“There should be no personal or partisan consideration in drawing districts. 
Voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around.” 
 Non-partisan actors and members of the minority party criticized North 
Carolina’s legislative process, saying that reforms are necessary. Chris 
Fitzsimon, director of the non-profit NC Policy Watch, is quoted on the NC 
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Coalition for Lobbying and Government Reform’s website saying, “Democracy at 
its best is a battle of ideas. The current [legislative] redistricting process 
discourages real debates about the issues facing North Carolina by deciding 
many elections before a single vote is cast.” Fitzsimon recently praised the N.C. 
House Republicans’ decision to pass legislation that would create an Iowa-style 
redistricting process for 2021. 
 Republican Senator Peter Brunstetter agreed that North Carolina’s 
districts are unfair: “Legislators pick voters rather than voters picking their 
legislators. With the advent of redistricting technology—where you can drag and 
drop neighborhoods from one district to another—there are very few really 
contestable districts [here in North Carolina]. In the Senate, for example, there 
are only 6 to 10 districts that are truly contestable.”  
 Art Pope described Sutton 3 as “a map that goes all over the place” 
(2001).  He was also quoted in the Mount Airy News criticizing the Sutton 5 maps 
on the grounds that the procedures were unfair.  
 
Fairness and Competition 
 Observers of the political process believe that fairness and competition 
are linked—and that both are important. Mitch Kokai explained that competition 
and fairness are distinct, but interdependent: “Competitive elections are 
important, though this is not the same as fair elections. If 80 percent of the state’s 
population supports a particular party, it’s entirely possible that many of the races 
for particular legislative seats will be uncompetitive. Competition also depends on 
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factors wholly unrelated to election maps, such as the major parties’ relative skill 
in recruiting and supporting their candidates. That said, fair elections based on 
legal, constitutionally sound election maps are likely to produce competitive 
elections in North Carolina, where both Republicans and Democrats have been 
able to mount successful statewide campaigns in recent decades.” 
 John Locke Foundation president John Hood noted that fairness in the 
system can affect competition, but that competition shouldn’t be the only—or 
even the primary—consideration when drawing maps: “The political system 
should not impose constraints on electoral competition; which is not the same as 
saying that the system should censure elections. But you don’t have to bend over 
backwards to maximize cases where both major party candidates are…equally 
likely to win. But the system shouldn’t impose constraints on one candidate or 
another, either, or be drawn to help incumbents or to hurt newcomers.” 
 Senator Brunstetter, a Republican whose district (at the time of the 
interview) had been drawn by Democrats, said that even his own district was 
uncompetitive due to political gerrymandering: “I never have to worry about a 
general election opponent. Only a primary. Most of the districts are not 
competitive. If you have 20 percent or fewer of seats contestable, that’s not a fair 
election. The goal should be representative democracy—but with this level of 
competition, that’s not what we’re getting.” To Brunstetter, who observed the 
redistricting process as a member of the minority party, it was clear that 
competition and fairness in redistricting are unavoidably—and intentionally—
linked. 
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The Role of Partisanship 
 Partisan and non-partisan actors view the relationship between fairness 
and competition differently, and also see competition in notably different ways. In 
general, partisans (particularly those out of office) view fairness as a means to an 
end: a restraint on gerrymandering or dirty-dealing by the “other” party; they 
sometimes recognize it as an important check on their own party as well.  
 Both partisan and non-partisan actors noted that redistricting is inherently 
a partisan process. The Raleigh News & Observer’s (2004) account of one 
incident during redistricting hearings is illustrative: “[Johnston Superior Court 
Judge] Jenkins admonished lawyers for making political statements in their 
arguments. And after listening to Wednesday's courtroom barbs, he asked the 
attorneys to refrain from characterizing the motives of the other side. ‘When we 
do that, we simply get away from what we're here for,’ Jenkins said. ‘It's more 
effective for a jury than for a proceeding like this.’”  
 Minority party partisans view partisanship as particularly detrimental to the 
redistricting process, while those in the majority often consider redistricting a 
“spoil of war.” Peter Brunstetter cited partisanship (on the part of Democrats) as 
the reason his bill to create a redistricting commission did not leave committee: 
“[The bill] was buried. I filed the bill when I first got to the legislature in 2006 or 
2007. [It was] assigned to the Ways and Means Committee, which hasn’t met in 
years. Now, it’s in Judiciary I, [of which] Martin Nesbitt was Chairman. He 
basically said that the [Senate] Pro-Tem’s office wouldn’t let it be heard. Their 
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interest is in retaining power. And their method [redistricting] has been very 
effective. There’s been no change in the [partisanship of the] NC Senate since 
1898—a pretty good winning streak.” 
 Art Pope, a member of the Republican minority during redistricting, was 
quoted in the Jacksonville Daily News saying that partisanship should not be 
considered for drawing maps (particularly when meeting Voting Rights Act 
requirements), “We are not asking for it to be a partisan Republican map. We are 
not asking for a partisan Democrat map. If creating a majority black district 
makes an adjoining district less Democratic or more Republican, then so be it. 
Let the chips fall where they may” (2001). 
 Both partisan and non-partisan actors believe that a noticeable lack of 
competition often indicates that districts have been drawn unfairly. Bill Cobey’s 
explanation of the motivations behind Stephenson highlights the interplay of 
partisan interests and “good government” outcomes: “We [Republicans] were not 
happy with the redistricting outcome. Many Republican House Members had 
individually worked deals out with [House Speaker] Jim Black to save their 
seats—the hearings were just a façade. It became impossible to fight 
legislatively. [NCGOP lawyer] Tom Farr said a legal case was possible [because 
of the split counties.]…In the end, it was a good constitutional decision. It favored 
Republicans, but in the long term it [codified] the whole county provision, which is 
good for voters. 
 Former Republican gubernatorial candidate Patrick Ballantine’s response 
includes reactions to the 2001 redistricting who proved “unlikely allies”—including 
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editors at the several local newspapers. These allies noted that 2001’s “unfair” 
districts would likely lead to uncompetitive elections for the next decade. “The 
senior political columnist for the News & Observer agreed with me that the 
elections were ‘rigged,’ noting that ‘the outcome of most of the next year’s races 
for the 170 legislative seats are a foregone conclusion.’ And a lead editorial 
chastised Democrats for ‘muscling out reason,’ Ballantine said. The Greensboro 
News & Record, Ballantine remembered, called the legislative district maps 
‘indefensible.’ It criticized the General Assembly for having ‘no interest in doing 
what’s right and fair and reasonable when there is a political advantage in doing 
what is wrong and unfair and outrageous. 
 Non-partisan actors view fairness as an important determinant of whether 
competition exists, and view competition as a good thing in its own right—
keeping parties honest and improving voter participation. Chris Fitzsimon of N.C. 
Policy Watch explained how partisan preferences affect redistricting outcomes: 
“When legislators draw maps, their first priority is keeping their own seats safe. 
Trade-offs and mutual agreements give incumbents who play the game friendly 
districts. More partisan districts give voters in the broad middle of the political 
spectrum little choice on Election Day.” 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Events in North Carolina from 2000 to 2008 confirmed my empirical 
findings. Redistricting bodies and court challenges exert a strong influence on the 
outcome of redistricting maps. The Stephenson
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principles that it enforced helped to create districts with low partisan bias 
(between .01 and .03) and relatively high levels of competition (see Table 5.1). 
Both members of the minority party and non-partisan observers of the process 
agreed that these outcomes were not possible using legislative redistricting 
alone. The precedents set by Stephenson lay a foundation for further reform in 
North Carolina. 
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Table 5.1: Maps Used in North Carolina Elections, 2000-2010 
Map 
Figu
re 
Election 
Partis
an 
Bias 
Competit
ion 
Original 1990s Maps 
1 
1992-2000 General 
Elections 
0.0253
7 
(2000) 
.5622 
Sutton House Plan 3 
2 
Not used in an 
election 
Not 
Includ
ed 
N/A 
Sutton House Plan 5 
3 
Not used in an 
election 
Not 
Includ
ed 
N/A 
Knox Jenkins Interim Maps 
4 
2002 General Election 
-
0.0170
8 
.5561 
Court-Sanctioned 
Legislative Maps 
5 
2004-2008 General 
Elections 
0.0374
7 
(avg.) 
.6367 
Session Law 2009-78 (HB 
1621) 
6 
2010 General Election 
Not 
Includ
ed 
Not  
Included 
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Figure 5.1: Original 1992 NC House plan (Used in 1992-2000 elections) 
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Figure 5.2: Sutton NC House Plan 5 (Never Used) 
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Figure 5.3: Sutton NC House Plan 3 (Never Used) 
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Figure 5.4: Interim/Jenkins House Maps (Used in 2002 NC Elections) 
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Figure 5.5: 2004 NC House Redistricting Plan (Used in 2004 Elections) 
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Figure 5.6: House Maps after HB 1621 (Used in 2010 Elections) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
A thorough understanding of the effects of redistricting at all levels—and 
the possible abuses of the power to draw districts—is imperative for thriving 
democracy. Redistricting is one of the few activities that allow incumbent elected 
officials to directly affect both their futures as political candidates and the quality 
of democracy in the areas where they serve.  This dissertation adds to the 
understanding of both the mechanics of redistricting and the possible 
consequences of various redistricting options—with possible implications for 
public policy (discussed below). 
This dissertation has shown that legislators’ personal and political 
preferences matter: that those preferences can be manifested in redistricting 
maps in the form of lack of partisan symmetry or bias, and that biased electoral 
maps translate into lower levels of electoral competition at the state level. These 
findings have important consequences for democracy and representation. 
Since Governor Elbridge Gerry voted to approve Massachusetts’ famous 
salamander—and probably long before—partisans have recognized the political 
value of wielding the pen that draws electoral districts. The first priority of 
incumbent political actors is reelection; legislators have a unique opportunity to 
make their own paths to reelection easier by drawing gerrymandered maps. 
Whether districts are drawn to protect incumbents, achieve desired electoral 
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results for a particular party, or to help or hinder a particular demographic group, 
unchecked gerrymandering plays a large role in electoral competition. With new 
redistricting technology, the kind of very precise demographic manipulation 
necessary to gerrymander is easier than it has been in the past. 
Of course, the desire to influence political outcomes is not necessarily 
limited to legislators. All individuals—from voters to politicians to bureaucrats—
are motivated more by self-interest than by public interest. When possible, any 
actors who can personally benefit from changes in redistricting will draw maps to 
benefit themselves and their parties. But actors with both personal and partisan 
preferences—the legislators themselves—are more likely to do this than those 
who have only partisan reasons for preferring certain outcomes. Legislators with 
the power to draw electoral maps gain both psychic benefits and tangible 
personal benefits—in the forms of party prestige, party power, and improved 
reelection prospects—from drawing maps with high levels of partisan bias.  
Because of these personal incentives, redistricting rules matter. Rules that 
prevent actors with personal and partisan motives from affecting the process are 
fairer; this analysis shows that maps drawn by legislators have significantly 
higher levels of partisan bias than maps drawn by judges, state-level 
administrators, and independent commissions.  
Partisan bias is important conceptually because of its use as an objective 
measure of absence of fairness in redistricting, but it is also important because it 
is a significant contributor to reduced electoral competition. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO LITERATURE 
This dissertation contributes to existing literature in two significant ways. 
First, it follows up Gelman and King’s (1994) initial comparisons of redistricting 
within states and redistricting’s effects on partisan symmetry—confirming the 
conclusion of their case study in Ohio. Second, it outlines the way in which 
redistricting practices and electoral competition are related, confirming past 
research on the topic and filling in important gaps in the existing explanation of 
the relationship between redistricting and competition. 
This dissertation builds on the comparisons of redistricting plans done by 
Gelman and King. Gelman and King’s (1987) introduction of a new model for 
evaluating electoral systems and redistricting plans allowed them to estimate the 
partisan bias and electoral responsiveness of the U.S. House of Representatives 
since 1900 and to evaluate the fairness of competing redistricting plans for the 
1992 Ohio state legislature—finding, in that case, that reapportionment maps 
drawn by a non-partisan commission had a lesser degree of partisan bias than 
proposed maps drawn by both Republican and Democratic members of the 
legislature (1994).  
My work expands on these findings by quantifying the differences between 
maps drawn by different actors and expanding the conclusions across states. It 
shows that maps drawn by legislators have significantly more partisan bias than 
maps drawn by judges, commissions, or members of the council of state. These 
findings hold regardless of party, political culture, and presidential elections. 
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Carson and Crespin (2004) and Winburn (2008) have shown that 
redistricting affects electoral competition—drawing a direct connection between 
redistricting practices and electoral outcomes. My research pinpoints partisan 
symmetry—and its converse, partisan bias—as the mechanism by which 
redistricting affects electoral competition. I show that states with high levels of 
partisan bias are more likely to have lower levels of electoral competition. And 
that those states’ districts are more likely to be drawn by legislators than by 
judges, commissions, or members of the council of state. 
Schaffner, Wagner, and Winburn (2004) examined legislators’ motivations 
when redistricting, noting that elected members of legislative bodies have both 
their own personal reelection goals and direct ties to the political parties. My 
research builds on their work by showing how the goals of those members affect 
redistricting outcomes. 
 
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
The findings in this dissertation have important normative implications. 
Both fairness of the democratic process and strong electoral competition have 
long been important goals of government reformers. Fair elections are necessary 
to ensure that governments are legitimate representatives of the people—central 
to the American commitment to the concept of “consent of the governed.” 
Representation itself relies on the assumption that elections accurately reflect 
citizens’ preferences. A thorough understanding of fair electoral processes—and 
the best way to achieve such goals—is important for reform. 
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Gerrymandering has historically been used to disenfranchise minority 
voters, from those in the minority party, to racial minorities, to those with minority 
opinions. It also allows legislators to indulge their own personal preferences over 
the public interest. Finding reliable and predictable ways to prevent 
gerrymandering—in this case by removing redistricting from the hands of 
legislators—can help attain representation for those minority voices. 
Gelman and King’s (1987) development of a method to quantify partisan 
symmetry gives legislators, officials, and pundits an objective way to measure 
what was once only theoretical and subjective. Definitions of fairness ranging 
from “voters choosing their legislators” or “I’ll know it when I see it” can now be 
quantified with measurements of partisan symmetry and bias. Furthermore, past 
methods for ensuring fair electoral procedures—such as the Voting Rights Act 
and state constitutional provisions for traditional districting principles—can be 
evaluated using an objective standard. This dissertation can be viewed as one 
step towards that goal. 
By quantifying fairness in several states over a ten-year period, this 
research shows that fair elections have consistently “good” consequences in 
terms of electoral competition. Government reformers have long listed 
competitive elections among their highest priority public policy goals—and for 
good reason. Researchers have found that, in addition to its effects on 
representation, competition has many other positive consequences, including: 
liberty, equality and accountability, community concerns and constitutionality. 
The North Carolina Coalition for Lobbying and Government Reform notes, 
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“Vigorous partisan abuse has characterized the redistricting process [in North 
Carolina] and lawmakers have used their power to ensure that most seats are 
safe, incumbents are practically guaranteed winners long before Election Day, 
and opposition candidates rarely run because of the impossibility of winning” 
(2011). Competition is necessary to keep American politics vibrant, responsive, 
and democratic. 
A recent article in Governing asks, “Can Redistricting Ever Be Fair?” 
(Greenblatt 2011). The article doesn’t ultimately answer the question, but 
Greenblatt’s list of the consequences of legislative redistricting provides insight 
into what absence of fairness looks like: incumbents’ trading of votes and favors 
in exchange for safe seats, very high levels of incumbency reelection, no 
turnover between political parties, and numerous seats where no competition 
between major parties exist.  Procedural fairness—i.e. an attempt to limit these 
types of political abuses—is a good goal in and of itself. Adam Cox notes that 
partisan fairness is “a normative commitment that both scholars and the 
Supreme Court have identified as a central concern of districting arrangements.” 
This measurement of fairness incorporates principles—such as representation 
and consent—that can be traced to the beginning of democratic elections. These 
principles ensure that democratic elections abide by the rule of law and reflect 
the real preferences of voters in a predictable, systematic, and unbiased manner. 
California is one state that has made recent attempts to remove 
partisanship from the redistricting process by creating an independent 
redistricting commission. Their process differs from that of the states examined in 
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this dissertation and merits future examination. The new California law, adopted 
by referendum in 2008, mandates that members of the redistricting commission 
and their immediate family members can’t have run as candidates within the past 
10 years or have served on party committees. Anyone who has worked as a 
lobbyist or given sizable campaign contributions is also prohibited from serving 
on the commission. The California state auditor narrowed down a list of 
thousands of applicants to a pool of 60 possible commissioners: 20 Republicans, 
20 Democrats and 20 independents. Legislative leaders from both parties then 
eliminated several people from contention—cutting the number of finalists to 36. 
From that list, eight names were randomly selected. They, in turn, chose six 
more of their colleagues, resulting in a commission made up of five Democrats, 
five Republicans and four unaffiliated voters.  
The commission is tasked with drawing district lines “in conformity with 
strict, nonpartisan rules designed to create districts of relatively equal population 
that will provide fair representation for all Californians” according to the 
Commission’s website. Using the Gelman-King method to measure the partisan 
symmetry of districts drawn by the resulting commission—and comparing the 
results to the 10 states I have already evaluated—would show whether California 
has been successful in eliminating partisan interests from the redistricting 
process. 
Florida is trying a different approach. In 2011, Florida voters approved a 
measure intended to prevent legislators from drawing maps with the intention of 
favoring one party or the other. However, the law fails to define this concept or 
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what measurable results will look like. As of this writing, Florida legislators have 
not released 2012 maps, so it is not clear what the new guidelines will mean to 
voters. Using partisan symmetry as a way to evaluate the maps might be a 
possible solution.  
 
NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Establishing a significant relationship between redistricting bodies, 
partisan symmetry, and competition will help proponents of electoral reform in 
North Carolina and other states by giving them empirical evidence to support 
their proposals. This research establishes the effectiveness of reforms that 
remove redistricting from the hands of legislators.  
Recent events in Raleigh highlight the need for redistricting reform in 
North Carolina. In the 2010 midterm elections, Republicans won control of both 
houses of the North Carolina General Assembly for the first time in nearly 100 
years. After years of Republican lobbying for redistricting reform, voters were 
optimistic that North Carolina’s elections would finally change as a result of the 
new leadership. So far, however, new leadership has taken only small steps 
towards reform—and only after new maps for 2012-2020 elections were 
completed.  
Critics allege that new Republican-drawn congressional and legislative 
maps violate both the Voting Rights Act and North Carolina’s whole county 
provision. Two lawsuits challenging the new GOP districts were filed in late 2011. 
The first lawsuit challenges the Republican maps on three main grounds: split 
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precincts, split counties, and the packing of minority voters. In filing the lawsuit, 
Democrats issued a press release that highlighted these statistics:  
“The state House redistricting plan divides 49 of North Carolina’s 100 
counties, while the state senate plan splits 19 counties, despite provisions 
in the N.C. Constitution requiring counties to remain whole to the greatest 
extent possible. Forty counties were arbitrarily split in the congressional 
map. Additionally, 395 precincts (containing nearly 1.9 million people) at 
the state House level and 257 precincts (containing 1.3 million people) at 
the state Senate level were split. This splitting of precincts often leads to 
voter confusion, lower voter turnout and higher election costs” (North 
Carolina Democratic Party, 2011). 
Based on party registration and ideological preferences, reformers have 
said that North Carolina's congressional delegation ought to be divided fairly 
evenly. Before the 2010 election, however, Democrats held an 8-5 edge in the 
congressional delegation. Based on the maps drawn by today's GOP-led General 
Assembly, it's possible that Republicans could take 10 of the state's 
congressional districts while Democrats could not lose any of the remaining 
three. It’s likely that such districts would yield very high levels of partisan bias. 
And if voters in 2012 vote as predicted, the seats-votes curves for North Carolina 
will be wildly skewed towards the Republican Party. 
Despite approval from the U.S. Justice Department of North Carolina’s 
legislative and congressional maps as they apply to the 40 VRA covered 
counties, civil rights and election watchdog groups filed a second legal challenge. 
The plaintiffs allege the Republican boundaries are an "intentional and cynical 
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use of race" to harm black voters while improving Republicans’ political prospects 
(Robertson 2011). 
Republicans created the controversial "majority-minority" election districts 
allegedly in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartlett v. Strickland, a 
case that began with a dispute over N.C. House districts in Pender County. 
When Pender County filed suit in 2007, its commissioners objected to the then-
Democratic General Assembly's decision to split both Pender and New Hanover 
Counties to create two House districts. Both districts included portions of Pender 
and New Hanover counties. 
Specific objections focused on District 18, which Democratic mapmakers 
crafted as a Voting Rights Act district designed to help black voters elect a 
representative of their choosing. The majority of registered voters were 
Democrats, but less than 40 percent of those voters were black. The N.C. 
Supreme Court rejected the district by a 4-2 vote in August 2007 on the grounds 
that the district did not meet VRA requirements because it did not have a 
majority-black population. Because the state should not have counted District 18 
as a VRA district, they found, mapmakers should have followed another court-
ordered criterion blocking the unnecessary splitting of counties. In 2009, the U.S. 
Supreme Court agreed, spelling out the requirement that a VRA district under 
Section 2 must have a minority population of at least 50 percent. 
Now, plaintiffs in the new lawsuit claim that Republicans used the 
Strickland ruling to pack majority-minority districts with black, Democratic voters 
in order to increase the likelihood of electing more Republicans in surrounding 
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districts. Nine of the districts in the 2011 N.C. Senate map qualified as majority-
minority districts, up from seven before redistricting. The 2011 N.C. House plan 
created 23 majority-minority districts, up considerably from the previous maps. 
Republicans’ new maps and the subsequent court challenges continue a 
pattern of gerrymandering allegations, partisan squabbling, and abuse of the 
public trust. Two possible reforms provide possible escapes from this kind of 
business-as-usual redistricting. Neither bill gained traction until after 2011 
redistricting plans were completed. This means any possible reforms would not 
take effect until 2021 redistricting. 
A bipartisan bill filed in April 2011 would create an independent citizens 
commission to oversee the redistricting process in North Carolina. Cosponsored 
by Sen. Ellie Kinnaird (D-Orange, Person) and Sen. Louis Pate (R-Greene, Pitt, 
Wayne), Senate Bill 591 ("Horton Independent Redistricting Comm.") would 
create a redistricting commission comprised of North Carolina citizens. Elected 
officials and lobbyists, along with legislative and campaign staff, would be barred 
from serving on the commission. Although the bill stalled in committee, it was a 
first step towards change in North Carolina. 
Another bill has had more success. The N.C. House of Representatives 
passed a redistricting reform bill on June 9, 2011 that would significantly improve 
the redistricting process for the next round of redistricting beginning in 2020. 
House Bill 824, titled “Nonpartisan Redistricting Process,” (2011) would 
remove the power of drawing new district lines from the members of the General 
Assembly and turn that power over to nonpartisan staff from the Legislative 
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Services Office.  These staff members would be sequestered from the House 
and Senate to create new redistricting plans without personal or partisan political 
influences.  
H824 is modeled after the process Iowa uses for redistricting, which has 
not had any redistricting lawsuits filed since its implementation.  Like the Iowa 
system, after the Legislative Services Office has prepared new district maps they 
would be presented to the House and Senate for an up or down vote without 
changes. The N.C. Senate will vote on the bill in 2012. This dissertation bolsters 
proponents’ arguments for passing such a bill. 
Another possible change to North Carolina’s redistricting process could be 
for legislators to revive 2005 proposals to use quantitative measures to evaluate 
districts before they are approved. A bill to reform redistricting in 2005 would 
have created a “total quality score” for proposed districts, using Reock quotients 
as one of the components:  
“The total quality score for each proposed redistricting plan shall be 
computed as the sum of three component scores, each of which is 
chosen to achieve a particular goal. The three goals are: compactness; 
one person, one vote; and minimizing the number of split counties, 
municipalities, and precincts: (a) The goal of compactness is to avoid 
elongated and irregular districts. The component score which quantifies 
this goal shall be the Reock quotient for the plan. The 'Reock quotient for 
the plan' means the average of the Reock quotients for each proposed 
district in the plan. The Reock quotient for a district is the area of the 
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district divided by the area of the smallest possible enclosing circle, a 
number between 0 and 1” (2005, S997). 
Although the bill has not been reintroduced in the current session, it sets 
the groundwork for possibly using partisan symmetry as part of a quality score in 
the future. King and Grofman have campaigned to have partisan symmetry 
scores used as the officially recognized Court standard for measuring 
gerrymandering, pursuant to Vieth v. Jubilerer, in which five justices concluded 
that some standard might be adopted in a future case. When gerrymandering 
came before the Court in LULAC v. Perry, King et al. (2005) filed an Amicus Brief 
proposing the test be based in part on the partisan symmetry standard. Although 
the issue was not resolved, the proposal was discussed and positively evaluated; 
the Court gave some indication that a future legal test for partisan 
gerrymandering will likely include partisan symmetry. (Of the 11 states in which 
commissions have primary responsibility for drawing maps—Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Washington, and Wyoming—none currently use partisan symmetry as a standard 
for evaluation.) This dissertation contributes to the evidence that using partisan 
symmetry as a standard could meaningfully affect electoral outcomes. 
There are considerable data confirming that defining quantitative 
measures for districting principles helps to avoid confusion and corruption. Reock 
suggested his scores could be used to measured compactness in order for states 
to have an objective and reliable measure (1961). Of the many state laws that 
require compactness in redistricting, some fail to define or specify how 
compactness is determined. In states that fail to define compactness, there has 
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been a considerable amount of difficulty in determining whether the ultimate map 
is, in fact, compact. Creating standards for definition and measurement in the 
case of compactness could have prevented such difficulties. 
Like partisan symmetry, compactness has been recognized by the 
Supreme Court in several cases, with the Court expressly noting that 
“compactness does have to be one of [redistricting’s] primary goals.” Using 
partisan symmetry as a standard by which maps must be measured prior to 
adoption could prevent wasted money and time litigating maps and could 
improve the fairness and predictability of electoral outcomes. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, this dissertation makes important contributions to political science 
literature on redistricting, government reformers’ normative goals, and potentially 
to public policy. Redistricting, electoral fairness, and electoral competitions are all 
key pieces to ensuring accurate, equal representation for all citizens. A clear 
understanding of these issues is essential to a thriving democracy and to honest 
and open government.  
My research also points to a possible solution for the perennial problem of 
gerrymandering and the negative effects that accompany it: decreased turnout, 
ugly lawsuits, partisan infighting, decreased public trust, and low levels of 
representation. This is an important and timely contribution to political science 
knowledge and to the ongoing public policy debate in North Carolina and around 
the country. 
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APPENDIX A: STATE LEGISLATIVE COURT CHALLENGES 1992-2008 (Source: 
National Conference of State Legislatures 2012) 
 
ALABAMA 
• Barnett v. Alabama, No. Civ.A. 01-0433 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2001) (three-
judge court): Plaintiffs challenged the Legislature’s failure to re-draw the 
Alabama House and Senate districts following the 2000 census. The 
Legislature passed plans that were approved by the governor on July 3, 
2001. When those plans were precleared in October and November 2001, 
the district court dismissed the complaint as moot. 
• Montiel v. Davis, No. Civ.A. 01-0447-BH-S, 215 F. Supp.2d 1279 (S.D. 
Ala. Jul. 8, 2002) (three-judge court): On June 21, 2001, plaintiffs brought 
suit because the Alabama Legislature had not yet drawn new (post-2000 
census) districts for the Legislature, Congress, and State Board of 
Education. 215 F. Supp.2d at 1282 n.2. After the Legislature drew the 
House and Senate districts, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to 
challenge those districts. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the districts violated the 
one-man, one-vote principles found in the federal Equal Protection Clause 
and were the result of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. Id. at 1284-
88. The Board of Education claims and Congressional districts claims 
were severed. Id. at 1282 n.2. See also Barnett v. Alabama, 171 F. 
Supp.2d 1292 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 20, 2001) (severing and transferring the 
Congressional district claim). As to the state legislative districts, the Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. On the one-man, 
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one-vote challenge, the Court said that an overall deviation of less than 
ten percent from the “ideal district” was entitled to a rebuttable 
presumption of constitutionality. Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence to 
overcome that presumption. Id. at 1284-86. As to the racial gerrymander 
claim, the court explained that strict scrutiny is only triggered for 
application to a facially neutral law when the plaintiff “establish[es] that the 
‘legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles.’” 215 
F. Supp.2d at 1287 quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999). 
Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence to trigger strict scrutiny review, so 
their claim failed. 
• Webb v. Alabama, No. CV-01-1964 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery Co. Jan. 2002): 
On July 2, 2001, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the 
redistricting plans passed by the Legislature were constitutional. The 
defendants filed a motion seeking entry of judgment on the pleadings or, 
in the alternative, summary judgment on the ground that the complaint 
failed to state a justiciable controversy; the parties were in agreement that 
the redistricting plans were constitutional. In January 2002, a joint motion 
to dismiss was filed and the case was dismissed. 
• Ex parte Rice, No. 1010125 (Ala. Nov. 8, 2001): In October 2001, John 
and Camilla Rice filed a petition for writ of prohibition, mandamus, or other 
extraordinary relief in the Alabama Supreme Court to prevent Webb from 
proceeding in the Montgomery Circuit Court until the Alabama Supreme 
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Court had ruled on the appeal in Sinkfield (a case relating to 
Congressional districts). In November, the Court denied the writ. 
• Gustafson v. Johns, No. 05-00352-CG-C, 434 F. Supp.2d 1246 (S.D. Ala. 
May, 22, 2006) (three-judge court), aff’d No. 06-13508, 213 Fed.Appx. 872 
(11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2007) (unpublished): On June 16, 2005, plaintiffs 
challenged the Alabama House and Senate redistricting. The 19 voters 
alleged that the redistricting plans violated the one-person, one vote 
standard, were partisan gerrymanders, and violated plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment right to freedom of association. The district court held that res 
judicata barred the litigation as the present plaintiffs “were virtually 
represented by prior plaintiffs.” 434 F. Supp.2d at 1254.  
• Gustafson v. Johns, No. 06-13508, 213 Fed.Appx. 872 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 
2007): The first issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the appeal 
from the three-judge court was properly before it, or whether that appeal 
properly belonged in the United States Supreme Court. The Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction because “a finding that a plaintiff’s 
claim is barred by res judicata is not a resolution on the merits of the 
constitutional claim.” 231 Fed. Appx. at 875, relying on MTM, Inc. v. 
Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s holding that res judicata barred the litigation on a theory labeled 
“virtual representation.” 
 
INDIANA 
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No challenges. 
 
IOWA 
• Brown v. Iowa Legislative Council, 490 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1992): The Iowa 
Supreme Court upheld the decision of a state district court that the 
Legislative Council was not required to provide to a citizen taxpayer 
associated with an organization called Iowans against Gerrymandering 
access to geographic, political, and population databases created by the 
Iowa Legislature's redistricting software and database vendor, Election 
Data Services, Inc.  The databases were created for and purchased by the 
General Assembly for use in legislative redistricting and the computer 
program developed by the vendor interrelated the different forms and 
sources of information.  The database was encrypted, or coded, as 
required by contract with the original creator of the software.  The 
information or raw data used in the databases was public information and 
was otherwise available to the plaintiff.  The Supreme Court held that the 
computer databases were a trade secret of the vendor who prepared 
them.  
 
MISSISSIPPI 
• Barbour v. Gunn, No. 2003-EC-02169-SCT, 890 So.2d. 843 (Miss. Apr. 8, 
2004): The Mississippi Supreme Court was faced with a problem of 
resolving an ambiguity in the redistricting resolution that created the 
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House Districts, Joint Resolution No. 1 of the 2002 Regular Session. The 
issue was whether all of precinct 4 in Clinton, Mississippi was to be 
included in House District 72, as set forth in the resolution, or whether part 
of precinct 4 should have been included in House District 56, as shown by 
the Census 2000 maps that were incorporated by reference into the 
resolution. The Court concluded that the redistricting resolution provided 
for resolving these issues by making the boundaries used in the Census 
2000 maps controlling. It affirmed the decision of the trial court that found 
part of precinct 4 to be included in House District 56 and ordered a revote 
in that part of District 56. With the additional voters, the result of the 
election was reversed. 
 
NEW JERSEY 
• Page v. Bartels, No. 01-1733, 144 F. Supp.2d 346, 2001 WL 505187 (D. 
N.J. May 4, 2001): Plaintiffs sought to enjoin implementation of a 
legislative redistricting plan adopted by the New Jersey Apportionment 
Commission on April 11, 2001. They alleged that the plan violated § 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act and the 14th and 15th Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution because it reduced the concentration of African American 
voters in three legislative districts with an intent to dilute their voting 
strength. Defendants countered that the plan, while reducing the 
concentration of African Americans to less than a majority of the voting 
age population in the three districts, also increased the concentration of 
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African Americans in a fourth district, thus giving them an effective voting 
majority in all four districts, because both Hispanics and Whites often 
voted for African American candidates. The three-judge court found for the 
defendants, finding that the plan drafters had not intended to discriminate 
against African Americans and that the plan did not have the effect of 
diluting their voting strength. Rather, it likely would increase by one the 
number of African Americans elected to the Legislature from the four 
districts. 
• Robertson v. Bartels, 148 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.N.J. 2001), aff’d 1110 (Jan. 
22, 2002) (No. 01-721) (mem.): A white Republican state senator whose 
district was redrawn to raise its Black voting age population from 3.9 
percent to 35.3 percent alleged that the New Jersey Apportionment 
Commission had violated the Equal Protection Clause by protecting all 
minority incumbents but not all white incumbents. A three-judge panel 
granted summary judgment for defendants on the basis of res judicata. 
Although neither all the plaintiffs nor all the arguments were the same as 
in Page v. Bartels, the court found that the Robertson plaintiffs were in 
privity with the Page plaintiffs and their interests had been adequately 
represented by the Page plaintiffs. 
• McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Commission, No. M-728, September 
Term 2002, 54,209 (N.J. Mar. 6, 2003): On January 22, 2003, the Superior 
Court Appellate Division had stuck down the legislative plan because it 
violated article IV, § 2, of the New Jersey Constitution by dividing Newark 
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and Jersey City each into three legislative districts. On March 6, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court stayed the decision of the Appellate Division 
pending appeal, observing that the two cities had each been divided into 
at least three legislative districts ever since the constitutional prohibition 
had been adopted nearly 40 years before. The stay permitted the 2003 
elections to be run under the same plan as the 2001 election. 
• McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Commission, No. A-73, September 
Term 2002, (N.J. July 31, 2003): On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that the New Jersey Constitution’s political boundary 
requirement may not be validly enforced with respect to Newark and 
Jersey City without violating the Voting Rights Act. To pack all of Newark 
and Jersey City residents into two districts each after nearly 40 years of 
having three districts each, thereby reducing the Senators and Assembly 
persons representing them by one-third, would result in vote dilution in 
violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court also 
observed that the complaint could have been precluded under res judicata 
by the results of the earlier cases of Page v. Bartels and Robertson v. 
Bartels, since the McNeil plaintiffs either were plaintiffs in Page or were in 
privity with them, they sought the same relief invalidating the Bartels plan, 
and their state-law claim should have been raised in the same suit as their 
federal law claims under the doctrine of pendent (or “supplemental”) 
jurisdiction. It reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and 
reinstated the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint. 
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NEW YORK 
• Fund for Accurate and Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 796 F. 
Supp. 662 (N.D. N.Y. 1992) (per curiam) (assembly plan corrected; senate 
plan approved), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 650 (1992) (mem.) 
• Wolpoff v. Cuomo, Order, No. 14757-1922 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx County, 
May 14, 1992) (removed to federal court), 792 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. N.Y. 
1992) (remanded to state court), Order, No. 14757-1922 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
Bronx County, June 12, 1992) (assembly and senate plans rejected), 
rev'd, 80 N.Y.2d 70, 587 N.Y.S.2d 560, 600 N.E.2d 191 (1992) 
• City of New York v. United States Department of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 
906 (E.D. N.Y. 1993) (decision not to adjust census was not arbitrary or 
capricious) vacated and remanded 34 F.3d 1114 (2nd Cir. Aug. 8, 1994), 
rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1996) 
(decision not to adjust was reasonable and within secretary's discretion) 
 
NORTH CAROLINA 
• Daly v. Leake, (E.D. N.C., 2nd amended complaint filed Oct. 8, 1997) In 
July 1996, Jack Daly, a law student and Republican activist, and other 
plaintiffs filed a complaint against several congressional and legislative 
districts. They alleged racial gerrymanders under the Shaw doctrine. In 
October 1997, Daly amended his complaint to add plaintiffs with standing 
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to challenge six congressional districts, seven state Senate districts, and 
eight state House districts. Some of the challenged legislative districts 
were majority-minority districts whose minority percentages the State had 
increased in 1992 because first-round Section 5 preclearance had been 
denied. Others were overwhelmingly White districts surrounding those 
minority districts. A few others were majority-White districts not adjacent to 
minority districts. In those, Daly alleged that race was used as a proxy for 
party to create a partisan gerrymander. In April 1998, the same three-
judge panel that had a week earlier granted injunctive relief in Cromartie 
denied a preliminary injunction in Daly. The Court noted that Daly had 
waited seven months after filing his complaint before serving it on the 
defendants and had waited another 13 months before filing a motion for a 
preliminary injunction. Moreover, the Court noted he had presented no 
evidence other than a memo from himself as an expert witness, without 
demonstrating why he was qualified to be one. Such a record, the Court 
said, did not entitle Daly to emergency relief. 
• 2002-2008: Several cases. See Chapter 5. 
 
OREGON 
• Ater v. Keisling, 312 Or. 207, 819 P.2d 296 (1991) (secretary of state 
ordered to correct technical errors in house plan), corrected house plan 
approved sub nom. Linder v. Keisling, 312 Or. 316, 821 P.2d 1089 (1991)  
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• Republican Party of Oregon v. Keisling, 959 F.2d 144 (D. Or. 1992) 
(delayed election for senators with staggered terms approved), cert. 
denied, 504 U.S. 914 (1992) 
• Hartung v. Bradbury, 332 Or. 570, 33 P.3d 972 (2001): Petitioners 
challenged a legislative plan prepared by the Secretary of State after the 
Legislature adjourned its regular session sine die without enacting one, 
following the Governor’s veto of the plan passed by the Legislature. 
Exercising original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, Riggs, J., held that: (1) 
the plan did not violate the “separate vote” requirement of the Oregon 
Constitution; (2) the Governor had the power to veto the Legislature's 
redistricting plan; (3) the Secretary of State’s plan did not violate the 
constitutional provision that senate districts must consist of contiguous 
counties as limited by Fourteenth Amendment; (4) the secretary's 
population variance guidelines among districts met state and federal 
constitutional requirements; (5) the plan did not violate the statutory 
requirement that the secretary consider community of common interest in 
drawing boundaries; (6) the plan did not violate the statutory requirement 
that the secretary utilize political boundaries as nearly as practicable in 
drawing boundaries; and (7) the plan violated population equalization 
required by statute by using known incorrect census data. The court 
granted one petition and dismissed the remaining ones. 
• Carter v. U.S. Department of Commerce, No. 02-35161 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 
2002): Plaintiff Oregon state legislators sought release of the adjusted 
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census data for 2000 under the Freedom of Information Act. The Census 
Bureau resisted, citing the “deliberative process” privilege. The district 
court found that the deliberative process privilege did not permit 
nondisclosure of the adjusted numbers because they were neither 
predecisional nor deliberative and ordered the Department of Commerce 
to release the adjusted data. The court of appeals affirmed. 
 
RHODE ISLAND 
• Parella v. Irons, No. 02-4578 (Providence Superior Ct. Oct. 8, 2003), aff’d 
sub nom. Parella v. Montalbano, No. 2003-595 (R.I. June 9, 2006): A 1994 
amendment to the Rhode Island Constitution reduced the number of 
senators from 50 to 38 and the number of representatives from 100 to 75, 
effective for the members taking office in January 2003. The 2001 General 
Assembly created a Reapportionment Commission to recommend Senate, 
House, and congressional plans to the General Assembly, in accordance 
with standards of equal population, compactness, contiguity, communities 
of interest, and fair representation set forth in the law. 2001 R.I. Pub. Law 
ch. 315 (July 13, 2001). The 2002 General Assembly enacted legislative 
plans as 2002 R.I. Pub. Law ch. 4 (Feb. 20, 2002), coded as R.I. Gen. 
Laws 1956 § 22-1-2 (Senate districts) and § 22-2-2 (House districts). 
Plaintiffs residing in four Senate districts challenged the Senate plan as 
failing to meet the constitutional mandate that districts be “as compact in 
territory as possible.” R.I. Const. art. 8, § 1. They argued that their four 
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districts did not follow natural, historic, geographic, or political lines, as 
required by 2001 R.I. Pub. Law ch. 315, § 2. The trial court placed upon 
plaintiffs the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute 
violated the constitution, as would be appropriate in any case challenging 
the constitutionality of a statute. The trial court concluded that “[t]he 
compactness clause is violated ‘only when a reapportionment plan creates 
districts solely for political considerations, without reference to other 
policies, in such a manner that the plan demonstrates a complete 
abandonment of any attempt to draw equal, compact and contiguous 
districts.’” (quoting Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 986 (R.I. 1984)). The 
trial court held that the plan did not violate the compactness requirement. 
On June 9, 2006, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court. 
 
WASHINGTON 
No cases.
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APPENDIX B: NC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Only names appearing in bold responded to interview requests. 
1. Superior Court Judge Knox Jenkins 
a. Explain your role in the NC redistricting cases. 
b. Explain the maps you drew. Why did you make these specific 
changes to the NCGA map? 
c. Do you think having an independent districting commission or more 
districting principles (like standards for compactness) would make 
NC elections fairer? 
2. Plaintiffs in Stephenson v. Bartlett: ASHLEY STEPHENSON, LEO 
DAUGHTRY, PATRICK BALLANTINE, ART POPE, BILL COBEY 
a. Explain your role in the Stephenson v. Bartlett case. 
b. Why did you take part as a plaintiff? 
c. What was the goal of the case? 
d. Were Judge Jenkins’ maps “fair”? 
e. What should maps look like to be “fair”? 
f. Do you think competitive elections are important? Why (or why 
not?) 
g. What about an IRB, compactness? 
3. Members, State Board of Elections during Bartlett case: GARY O. 
BARTLETT, LARRY LEAKE, ROBERT B. CORDLE, GENEVIEVE C. 
SIMS, LORRAINE G. SHINN, CHARLES WINFREE 
a. Explain your role in the Stephenson v. Bartlett case. 
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b. Do you think the maps drawn by Judge Knox Jenkins were “fair”? 
c. Do you think having an independent districting commission or more 
districting principles (like standards for compactness) would make 
NC elections fairer? 
d. Do you think competitive elections are important? Why (or why 
not?) 
4. Former Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, who presided over Stephenson v. 
Bartlett, 357 NC 301 (94PA02-2) 07/16/2003 
a. Explain your role in the NC redistricting cases. 
b. Do you think having an independent districting commission or more 
districting principles (like standards for compactness) would make 
NC elections fairer? 
5. NC Senator ANDREW BROCK (R-, sponsor of “AN ACT TO AMEND THE 
CONSTITUTION TO REFORM LEGISLATIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL 
REDISTRICTING” 
a. What is the goal of this legislation? 
b. Why do you think districts should be compact? 
c. Do you think North Carolina’s general assembly elections are “fair?” 
d. What should maps look like to be “fair”? 
e. Other members of the NCGA think an independent districting 
commission would be a better way to ensure fair elections. What do 
you think of that plan? 
f. Who opposed your bill? What were their reasons? 
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6. NC Senator PETER S. BRUNSTETTER (R-Forsyth), sponsor of “AN ACT 
TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA TO 
ESTABLISH HAMILTON C. HORTON INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING 
COMMISSION.” 
a. What is the goal of this legislation? 
b. Do you think North Carolina’s general assembly elections are fair? 
c. What should maps look like to be “fair”? 
d. Other members of the NCGA think that standards to enforce 
compact districts would be a better way to ensure fair elections. 
What do you think of that plan? 
e.  Who is the opposition to your bill? What are their reasons? 
7. Capital Reporters, MITCH KOKAI (News 14 Carolina), BARRY SMITH 
(Freedom Communications), Josh Ellis (New & Observer); and Local 
Pundits: JOHN HOOD and Chris Fitzsimon 
a. What is your take on the Stephenson v. Bartlett case? 
b. Which maps do you think are more fair, Knox Jenkins’ or the 
General Assembly’s? 
c. What should maps look like to be “fair”? 
d. Do you think competitive elections are important? 
e. Do you think having an independent districting commission or more 
districting principles (like standards for compactness) would make 
NC elections fairer? 
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